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Long-term versus Short-term Contracting in Salesforce Compensation
Fei Long
This dissertation investigates multi-period salesforce incentive contracting. The first
chapter is an overview of the problems as well as the main findings. The second chapter
continues with a review of the related literatures. The third and fourth chapters address
a central question in salesforce contracting: how frequently should a firm compensate its
sales agents over a long-term horizon? Agents can game the long-term contract by varying
their effort levels dynamically over time, as discussed in Chapter 3, or by altering between
a “bold” action and a “safe” action dynamically over time, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 studies multi-period salesforce incentive provisions when agents are able to
vary their demand-enhancing effort levels dynamically. I establish a stylized agency-theory
model to analyze this central question. I consider salespeople’s dynamic responses in exerting
effort (often known as “gaming”). I find that long time horizon contracts weakly dominate
short time horizon contracts, even though they enable gaming by the agent, because they
allow compensation to be contingent on more extreme outcomes — this not only motivates
the salesperson more, but also leads to lower expected payment to the salesperson. A
counterintuitive observation that my analysis provides is that under the optimal long time
horizon contract, the firm may find it optimal to induce the agent to not exert high effort in
every period. This provides a rationale for effort exertion patterns that are often interpreted
as suboptimal for the firm (e.g., exerting effort only in early periods, often called “giving
up”; exerting effort only in later periods, often called “postponing effort”). I also discuss
the implication of sales pull-in and push-out, and dependence of periods (through limited
inventory) upon the structure of the optimal contracting.
Chapter 4 examines multi-period salesforce incentive contracting, where sales agents can
dynamically choose between a bold action with higher sales potential but also higher variance,
and a safe action with limited sales potential but lower variance. I find that the contract
format is determined by how much the firm wants later actions to depend on earlier outcomes.
Making later actions independent of earlier demand outcomes reduces agents’ gaming, but it
also reduces an agent’s incentive to take bold actions. When the two periods are independent,
an extreme two-period contract with a hard-to-achieve quota, or a polarized two-period
contract allowing agents to make up sales, can strictly dominate a period-by-period contract,
because they induce more bold actions in earlier periods by making later actions dependent on
earlier outcomes. However, when the two periods are dependent through a limited inventory
to be sold across two periods, the period-by-period contract can strictly dominate the two-
period contract, by allowing the principal more flexibility in adjusting the contract.
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Salesforce expenditures account for 10%–40% of the revenues of US firms (Albers and
Mantrala 2008); this is of the order of hundreds of billions of dollars annually and is about
three times the amount spent on advertising (Zoltners et al. 2008). Consequently, how to
best motivate salespeople is of prime importance to most firms, and salesforce compensation
design problems have drawn significant attention from economists and marketing researchers,
prominent early papers in each area being Ho¨lmstrom (1979) and Basu et al. (1985), respec-
tively. In most cases, demand outcomes are uncertain and sales activities (e.g., how much
effort the agent exerts, what actions the agent takes) are not fully observable by the firm;
this makes the determination of compensation, which is to reimburse for sales agents’ costly
actions, a difficult problem.
Typical compensation contracts used by firms are comprised of a fixed part (e.g., base
salary) and a variable part (e.g., commissions on sales or discrete bonuses awarded for achiev-
ing a quota of sales during a specified time period). Based on a survey of Fortune 500 firms
conducted by Joseph and Kalwani (1998), 58% of firms use commissions and over 90% use
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quota-based contracts in their compensation plans. Quota-based plans provide stronger in-
centives for salespeople to reach higher levels of sales, as variable compensation is awarded
only when certain sales goals are met. However, if the quota is either too difficult or too
easy to achieve, the actions taken by the salesperson will be suboptimal. This issue does not
exist with a commission-based contract, since every additional sales unit brings in additional
reward. Determining whether a firm should utilize quota-based bonuses or commissions to
incentivize their salesforce is an important problem.
Furthermore, firms employ salespeople for extended periods of time and they have to
determine how frequently salespeople are evaluated and rewarded, e.g., monthly, quarterly,
semi-annually, annually, a combination of these, etc. Coughlan and Joseph (2012) refer to
this as the time horizon over which rewards are offered to the salesperson, and state that
essentially all firms face this problem. When quota-based incentives are used in such a
multi-period setting, the issue of dynamic gaming arises. This is because, in a multi-period
scenario, agents may strategically adjust their actions over time, based on the way in which
uncertain outcomes are realized and the way the contract determines their reward during
current and future periods.
Indeed, dynamics gaming and the associated time horizon problem can extend beyond
the salesforce compensation context, and have a broader implication for many aspects of
firms’ decision-making. In financial markets, venture capitalists need to decide how often
they should finance entrepreneurs in order to maximize financial return (Diamond 1993).
Individual option investors make decisions about when to exercise their options, by trading
off between realizing current gains and forgoing future profits (Merton et al. 1973). In
supply chain management, understanding how often firms should replenish their inventory
when faced with uncertain demand over a long-term horizon, is a fundamental topic of
study (Scarf 1960). However, despite the importance of salesforce compensation, analytical
research on optimal horizons of salesforce compensation remains scarce.
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In this thesis, I attempt to narrow this gap by comparing long-term and short-term con-
tracting in salesforce compensation. I consider agents’ dynamic gaming within two different
contexts, in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I discuss how agents can game the long-term
contract by varying their effort levels dynamically over time. As a canonical example, con-
sider a scenario in which the salesperson is paid a bonus if a particular sales quota is met in
six months. To meet their six-month quota with minimum effort, the agent may strategically
shirk work in the first quarter hoping for a high demand outcome without much effort, and
exert greater effort only in the second quarter in case of low demand realization in the first
quarter. For similar strategic reasons, sales agents who have already achieved the quota in
early sales cycles may not have the incentive to put in extra effort later. This phenomenon of
agents dynamically adjusting their sales effort — both postponement of effort exertion and
shirking after achieving the quota — has been widely documented (e.g., Oyer 1998, Chen
2000, Steenburgh 2008, Misra and Nair 2011, Jain 2012, Kishore et al. 2013). Specifically,
postponement of effort exertion is considered an especially bad outcome from the firm’s point
of view because it involves not exerting effort before the sales quota is reached; it is some-
times known as the “hockey stick” pattern (because effort exertion is flat in early periods
and increases sharply in later periods, thus taking the shape of a hockey stick; Chen 2000).
Such perverse gaming incentives are, however, not present in commission-based contracts
where every additional unit of demand brings in additional compensation.
In Chapter 4, I discuss how agents can game the long-term contract by altering between
taking a “bold” action and a “safe” action dynamically over time. A bold action has both
a larger upside potential, and a larger downside risk in generating sales, compared to a safe
action. Unlike Chapter 3 in which agents’ effort exertion only increases the upside potential,
in Chapter 4, effort exertion increases both the upside potential and the downside risk, with
the former being greater than the latter. For example, when faced with a sales target, the
salesperson can spend time reaching out to new potential customers, which is considered
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bold since the reach might be unsuccessful; however if it is successful, it can bring higher
profits to the firm. Or, a salesperson can follow up with existing customers (Godes 2004,
Rubel and Prasad 2015), which has limited sales potential but is considered safer, since
the sales relationship has already been established. Such agents’ dynamic gaming behaviors
induced by a long-term incentive plan have been empirically documented by Chevalier and
Ellison (1997a). They find that, when faced with a yearly performance review, mutual fund
managers have an incentive later in the year to invest in riskier assets if they are close
to a performance target; they may also have an incentive to invest in safer assets and act
more passively if they have already met the performance target. The incentives to alter the
riskiness of investment described above are derived from management fees as a nonlinear
function of the calendar-year return.
In response to agents’ dynamic gaming, a firm has multiple options for structuring the
time horizon for a contract. A firm could offer a short time horizon contract that evaluates
and rewards an agent over a short-term horizon (e.g., every quarter). Alternatively, the
firm could offer a longer time horizon contract that evaluates and rewards the agent over
a long-term horizon (e.g., six months); in this case, the firm would also have to determine
the reward for a larger set of possible realizations. In each of these cases, the firm would
have to determine the structure of the contract, for instance, whether it should include only
commissions or whether it should include rewards for reaching quotas. If the firm chooses to
reward over a longer time horizon, with a quota-based contract, it would be more exposed
to gaming.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I ask the central question that firms face when employing
salespeople for an extended period of time: how often should sales agents be awarded?
Should the compensation be granted over a long-term period or be based on agents’ short-
term performance? Agents can game the long-term contract by varying their actions over
time; Chapter 3 focuses on agents’ effort exertion, and Chapter 4 focuses on agents’ dynamic
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engagement of bold and safe actions.
In Chapter 3, I examine multi-period salesforce incentive contracting in a two-period
scenario, involving a risk neutral agent with limited liability. In this setting, sales agents
can choose to vary their levels of effort dynamically. I show that two often ignored factors —
the agent’s outside option and level of limited liability — are important determinants of
the optimal time horizon and contract form, and of the agent’s effort-making. While it is
elementary that a fully flexible two-period contract will weakly dominate a period-by-period
contract, I find that a two-period contract can strictly dominate a period-by-period contract,
because it allows the reward to be contingent upon a more extreme sales outcome, even while
it allows the agent to game effort exertion.
I show that this insight continues to hold when the agent can borrow or postpone sales
between periods. However, if the time periods are dependent (e.g., a fixed amount of in-
ventory has to be sold across the two time periods), then a period-by-period contract can
strictly dominate given certain conditions. This is under the assumption that under the
period-by-period contract, the agent chooses his action only based on the current period’s
contract. However, if the agent is fully forward looking under the period-by-period contract,
and can predict how the second period’s contract may change based on the outcome of the
first period when there is a limited inventory, then a long-term contract still weakly dom-
inates a short-term contract. I also derive implications for the agent’s multi-period effort
profile and show that various profiles, including effort postponement, are induced under the
firm’s optimal contract.
Chapter 4 looks at multi-period salesforce incentive contracting when sales agents can
shift between a “safe” action and a “bold” action over two periods. I assume that the bold
action has a greater probability of generating extreme sales (both high and low) relative to
the safe action. Furthermore, the bold action’s upside potential is greater than its downside
risk, and thus, is preferred by the principal to the safe action ceteris paribus. I focus on
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the case where taking the bold action is more costly to the agent than the safe action, since
otherwise, there would be no conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.
I find that the optimal contract for inducing a bold action in Chapter 4, can be struc-
tured differently from the optimal contract for inducing effort exertion in Chapter 3. The
contract format is determined by how much the firm wants later actions to depend on earlier
outcomes. The optimal two-period contract for the principal is an “account-balance con-
tract”, an “extreme contract”, or a “polarized contract”, depending on the parameter space.
The “account-balance” contract compensates the agent based on how many times the agent
obtains high demand realization, and induces later actions that are independent of earlier
demand outcomes. The “extreme” contract incentivizes bold actions via a hard-to-achieve
quota, and induces later actions that are heavily dependent on earlier demand outcomes.
The “polarized” contract allows agents to act bold to make up sales if demand in the first
period is low, and induces later actions that are moderately dependent on earlier demand
outcomes.
In choosing an optimal contract, the principal faces the tradeoff between making later
actions dependent on earlier outcomes to incentivize more bold actions earlier on, and re-
ducing losses from an agent’s gaming. Making later actions independent of earlier demand
outcomes reduces agents’ gaming, but it also reduces incentives to take bold actions. There-
fore, if providing incentives is of a higher order, then either the extreme contract or the
polarized contract that induces later actions to be heavily or moderately dependent on ear-
lier outcomes respectively, is optimal for the firm. If reducing gaming losses is of a high
order, then the account-balance contract is optimal for the firm. Furthermore, it is weakly
less costly to induce bold actions in earlier periods than later periods. As a result, the princi-
pal prefers to encourage bold actions from the agent in the early period (given agents’ limited
liability). However, the optimal action precipitated during the second period is conditional
on the first period’s demand outcome.
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With independent periods, the long time horizon contracting weakly dominates short time
horizon contracting, since the “account-balance” long term horizon contract is a replication
of the short term contract. With dependent periods (i.e., a fixed amount of inventory has
to be sold across two time periods), a period-by-period contract can strictly dominate under
certain conditions, as when a bold action is induced in the early period but is not induced in
the later period upon a successful first period. This result holds under the assumption that
an agent chooses his action under the period-by-period contract only based on the current
period’s contract.
Across the two chapters I find general insights regarding the optimal action profile to be
encouraged by the principal. I find that given agents’ limited liability, in the presence of
agents’ dynamic gaming, the principal prefers to elicit the desirable action (i.e., the action
that leads to greater expected demand) from the agent in the early period. In the later period,
however, the principal may prefer to implement the desirable action only upon demand
realization that is more likely to occur in association with the desirable action in the earlier
period. Specifically, in Chapter 3, effort exertion is induced in the later period only when
the first period has a high demand realization. In Chapter 4, a bold action is induced in
the later period when the first period has a high or low demand realization (rather than
medium).
However, given different gaming behaviors in the agent (namely, effort variation in Chap-
ter 3, and dynamic shifting between bold and safe actions in Chapter 4), the optimal contract
structure may change. First, in Chapter 4, a polarized contract, rather than an extreme con-
tract, may be the most effective at inducing the agent to take a bold action. This is because
taking a bold action increases the probability of obtaining both high and low demand re-
alizations. Then, compensating the agent at the end of the second period if the earlier
demand realizes at extreme levels can motivate the agent to choose a bold action in the first
period. Second, given agents’ limited liability, the optimally chosen two-period contract is
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path-independent in Chapter 3, but may be path-dependent in Chapter 4, if the optimally
chosen contract is the polarized two-period contract.
To address whether a firm should reward their sales agents over a long-term horizon or
a short-term horizon, the major insights from the two chapters are that agents’ dynamic
gaming, in terms of effort exertion or dynamic shifting between bold and safe actions, can
benefit the principal if optimally induced. Overall, the two-period contract outperforms the
period-by-period contract with independent periods. However, the period-by-period contract
which gives the principal more flexibility in adjusting the contract may outperform the two-
period contract, when the two periods are not independent, under the assumption that
an agent chooses his action under the period-by-period contract only based on the current
period’s contract.
Finally, I want to highlight the constraints that I impose on the contract structure and
their impacts. First, I do not allow renegotiation under long-term contracting. This is critical
to my results, since commitments to the two-period contract at the beginning of the first
period are necessary for the two-period contract to outperform the period-by-period contract
for the principal. As Fudenberg et al. (1990) state, long-term contracting is valuable only
if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be
adopted tomorrow. This is because rational agents who anticipate renegotiation at the time
of exerting effort would have no incentive to exert more effort earlier on under long-term
contracting relative to short-term contracting (conditional on the same bonus payment).
Second, I assume that under short-term contracting, an agent chooses his action only based
on the current period’s contract. This would not change my results with independent periods.
However, with inter-dependent two periods, if the agent acts fully strategically under the
period-by-period contract, and chooses the first period’s action by anticipating how the
second period’s contract may change based on the outcome of the first period, then a long-





My research adds to the body of work on dynamic incentives with repeated moral haz-
ard. One line of academic inquiry assumes the firm to be risk neutral but the agent to
be risk averse, which leads to contracting frictions. Within this paradigm, Ho¨lmstrom and
Milgrom (1987) show that a linear contract is optimal for the principal when a number of
other assumptions hold. I note that the gradual two-period contract in Chapter 3, and
the account-balance contract in Chapter 4, that I derive as optimal for the firm under cer-
tain conditions, can be interpreted as a linear contract as well. However, these are only
optimal for intermediate values of effort effectiveness (recall that I assume the agent to be
risk neutral). A number of papers in the risk aversion paradigm revisit the assumptions
of Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), and demonstrate the optimality of non-linear contracts
(Rogerson 1985, Spear and Srivastava 1987, Scha¨ttler and Sung 1993, Sung 1995, Hellwig
and Schmidt 2002, Sannikov 2008, Rubel and Prasad 2015). Fudenberg et al. (1990) analyze
a variant of my question — when might a sequence of short-term contracts, similar to linear
contracts, replicate a long-term contract? My work differs in two perspectives. First, the
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“decreasing utility frontier” assumption in Fudenberg et al. (1990) is violated in my model
due to agents’ limited liability. Second, I counter-intuitively show when a long-term contract
cannot perfectly replicate, and may even perform worse, than a short-term contract.
A second line of inquiry on dynamic incentives assumes agents to be risk neutral and have
limited liability, which leads to a different kind of contracting friction (my dissertation falls
under this paradigm). Bierbaum (2002) studies how to elicit great effort from the agent in
each of the two periods (which may not be profit-maximizing for the principal), while I allow
different effort profiles to be elicited by optimal contracts, under varying conditions. Schmitz
(2005) studies the question of whether to employ the same or different agents in two periods,
given interdependence between the outcomes of the periods. Kra¨kel and Scho¨ttner (2016)
study the firm’s choice between offering commissions and offering bonuses, and determines
conditions under which one or the other (or a combination) is optimal, when the reward must
be paid at the end of multiple periods. Scho¨ttner (2016) studies optimal contracting when
the agent’s effort costs change over time. None of these papers, however, considers whether
long time horizon or short time horizon contracts are optimal. Relatedly, they do not permit
the agent to strategically borrow or postpone sales between periods, neither do they consider
the case of limited inventory to be sold across two periods, which creates a particular form
of interdependence between periods. In addition, these papers normalize the values of the
outside option and the limited liability, and are unable to study comparative statics with
respect to these quantities in association with the optimal contract and the induced effort
profile.
My work is also related to both the quantitative and behavioral study of agents’ gaming by
varying their actions over time under a long time horizon contract. Empirical literature has
consistently documented that salespeople tend to shirk in the early periods and increase effort
as they reach quota. Oyer (1998) and Steenburgh (2008) both document that firms sales
increase at the end of fiscal year, suggesting that sales people postpone effort exertion until
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the end of a compensation window to meet quota and get bonus. Misra and Nair (2011) finds
evidence for shirking by agents in the early part of the compensation cycle. Furthermore, a
significant increase in sales at the end of quarters suggest that agents tend to increase effort
as they reach closer to the end of a compensation window. Existing explanations on the
“hockey-stick” phenomenon where sales agents postpone effort exertion focus on suboptimal
behaviors from either the principal or the agent. Chen (2000) shows that if quotas are not
in line with an agent’s productivity, the salesperson may find it optimal to wait to resolve
uncertainty over the realization of early demand shocks. On the other hand, Chung et al.
(2014) focus on suboptimal gaming behaviors committed by the agent. They discover from
a counterfactual analysis that effort concentration in later periods can arise from agents’
myopic behaviors. A forward-looking agent would smooth out efforts over time to take
into account the uncertainty in future demand shocks. Goal literature, adopts a behavioral
perspective to explain agents’ procrastination. Kivetz et al. (2006) propose the goal gradient
hypothesis, and Heath et al. (1999) use goal-serving as a reference point to explain effort
postponement in agents. The idea is that goals have diminishing returns, and thus combining
multiple short term goals into a long term goal will result in less effort exertion earlier on.
Also writing from the behavior standpoint, Jain (2012) studies the scenario where agents
lack in self-control. Then, the principal can take advantage of agents’ lack of self-control to
maximize her profits by paying a single bonus at the end, which essentially encourages effort
postponement.
A second type of agents’ dynamic gaming predicted by my model — the “give-up” pattern
where agents reduce effort after realizing that they have no chance to reach at a bonus also
have been documented empirically. For instance, Steenburgh (2008) shows that for agents
who are unlikely to make quota, they give up if they feel that they cannot make the quota.
Jain (2012) argues that long time horizon quotas can sometimes lead to the salesperson
decreasing effort in later periods, if he believes that he cannot make the quota. Chung and
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Narayandas (2017) find empirical evidences that under a monthly quota plan, salespeople
who had a series of bad luck early in the month may decide to give up late in the month
because there is no chance that they can meet or exceed the quota set by the firm. An earlier
paper from Chung et al. (2014) shows similar results that weak performers may give up if they
realize that sales quotas under the long time horizon contract become unachievable. Also
in this paper, Chung et al. (2014) present that the best performers will reduce productivity
after attaining quotas. On a similar note, Misra and Nair (2011) show from their structural
analyses that agents may shirk after they already bring in enough sales to meet a quota.
These evidences correspond to a third type of dynamic gaming predicted by my model — the
“relaxing” pattern where salespeople relax after they meet their quota. Separate from the
above explanations for agents’ effort gaming patterns, my work in Chapter 3 provides the
novel insight that agents’ gaming behaviors can indeed be optimally induced by the firm to
improve the firm’s profits.
Most of the literature mentioned focuses on the demand-enhancing impact of effort, where
effort does not directly affect variance in sales outcomes. In Chapter 4, I study a different
problem where agents’ actions affect both the mean and the variance of demand outcomes.
With risk averse agents, this can lead to contracting friction due to the associated risk-return
tradeoff. Godes (2004) reveals that when risk can be endogenously determined by the agent,
compared with exogenous risk, fixed salaries fail to provide sufficient incentives. As a result,
the principal needs to increase the commission to incentivize effort. Another related paper
comes through Rubel and Prasad (2015), who consider agents’ risk-shifting in a dynamic
setting from the perspective of a carryover effect between two periods. Distinct from this
stream of literature, the friction in my work stems from agents’ dynamic gaming rather than
risk aversion.
Chapter 4 is also related to the literature on innovation in economics (Holmstrom 1989,
Aghion and Tirole 1994, Manso 2011). Manso (2011) studies a juxtaposition of the moral-
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hazard problem with the exploration-exploitation problem, where the “exploitation” action
leads to a high failure rate in early periods, but can reveal information about potentially
superior actions. The optimal contract in Manso (2011) has the common feature of early
failure being tolerated, and long-term contracting being preferred over short-term contract-
ing. However, in Manso (2011), the results are driven by interdependence between the two
periods: the principal is more willing to reward short-term failure in order to inform the
later period’s successful rate. In my work, there is no learning and the two periods are inde-
pendent; the principal still benefits from aggregating contracts to provide the most effective
incentives for agents with limited liability.
Many papers document agents’ dynamic gaming in altering between acting bold or play-
ing safe under a long time horizon contract. Brown et al. (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison
(1997b) find that fund managers appear to act bold late in the year by investing on portfolios
with greater volatility and try to catch the market, if they are a few points behind. They
also found that fund managers may also have an incentive to play it safe and act more like
an index fund if they are ahead of the market. In Ederer and Manso (2012)’s experiment,
subjects choose between following tips from the previous manager, or explore different loca-
tions to discover a more profitable strategy, which is considered bold since the new strategy
may or may not be as profitable as the previous manager’s strategy. The variability of action
choices significantly declines over the course of their experiment, suggesting that subjects
tend to act bold in early periods and play safe in later periods.
My results that setting a hard-to-achieve quota by combining compensation periods, or
providing makeup opportunities, can be more effective in inducing bold actions are also
supported empirically. Chung and Narayandas (2017) collaborate with a retail chain at
Sweden that sells electronic goods. They find that less frequent quotas encourage salespeople
to sell more high-margin products and pursue fewer incremental sales. Lerner and Wulf
(2007) suggest that the shift from compensating corporate R&D heads using short term
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contracting to long term contracting is associated with more heavily cited patents. Both
papers suggest that delayed rewards incentivize more bold actions. Furthermore, Azoulay
et al. (2011), and Ederer and Manso (2013) show that protecting agents from earlier downside
risk encourages bold actions at earlier periods. An article from Wall Street Journal 1 reported
that a growing number of startup companies are explicitly rewarding employees who acted
bold but failed by giving cash prizes or trophies in order to encourage creativity. This
evidence aligns with my result that offering agents makeup opportunities in later periods
motivates agents to act bold in earlier periods.
My research also adds to the extensive literature on salesforce incentives in marketing
which, in addition to the papers already cited, includes Raju and Srinivasan (1996), Simester
and Zhang (2010) and Zhang (2016), among many others. Finally, insights from my disser-
tation are related to the contract design literature in operations research and finance. My
extension into limited inventory is related to the work on salesforce compensation when
operational considerations are important (Chen 2000, Plambeck and Zenios 2003, Dai and
Jerath 2013, Saghafian and Chao 2014, Dai and Jerath 2016, Dai and Jerath 2018a, Dai and
Jerath 2018b). The optimality of the quota-bonus contract in motivating sales agents’ effort
is related to the optimality of the target rebate contract in incentivizing retailers’ ordering
in supply chain management (Taylor 2002), in which the rebate is paid for each unit sold
beyond a specified target. The implication of the quota-bonus contract in inducing effort
exertion and risk seeking from the sales agent also has its counterpart in finance — debt
structure induces effort and risk seeking behaviors among entrepreneurs by maximizing the




Multi-Period Incentives and Effort
Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
As I have introduced in Chapter 1, the problems of determining the time horizon of com-
pensation and determining the optimal compensation structure are inter-related. This is
an issue that essentially every company that uses a salesforce must resolve — non-linear
quota-based incentive contracts lead to stronger incentives but invite gaming, while linear
commission-based incentive contracts reduce gaming but also weaken incentives.
Previous empirical research has studied this tradeoff and has not reached a clear answer
regarding which factor — the incentive effect or the gaming effect — dominates in a multi-
period dynamic incentives scenario under which conditions. Oyer (1998) analyzes aggregate
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years 1984–
1988 spanning scores of industries in which quota-based plans are used and detects dynamic
gaming effects, and suggests that this gaming hurts more than the incentive effect helps.
Steenburgh (2008) analyzes individual salesperson-level data from a Fortune 500 company
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that sells durable office products and uses quota-based plans, and determines that stronger
incentives dominate the downside from gaming (and also states that analyzing these data
in aggregate would produce results similar to those reported in Oyer (1998)). Misra and
Nair (2011) uses a dynamic structural model to analyze data from a Fortune 500 contact
lens manufacturer and shows that a plan that uses only commissions performed better than
a quota-based plan (that was originally in use at the company); using only commissions
makes the time horizon decision irrelevant. Kishore et al. (2013) studies this question using
data from a large pharmaceutical firm in an emerging market and finds that commissions
do better than quotas by preventing gaming, but this comes at the cost of neglecting non-
incentivized tasks. Chung et al. (2014) uses a dynamic structural model to analyze data
from a Fortune 500 office durable goods manufacturer and determines that quotas, through
higher effort motivation, perform better than plans without quotas in spite of gaming effects
being present; it also finds that both short-term and long-term quotas have roles to play.
Across these studies, choosing a better (even if not “optimal”) compensation plan can lead
to very significant increases in revenues and profits, of the order of 5% to 20%. These papers
also carefully document the effort exertion profiles of agents induced by different types of
contracts in a multi-period scenario. They consistently report effort postponement as an
issue of concern in long time horizon contracts. Overall, existing empirical research has
found the problem of determining the optimal time horizon (and contract form) to be highly
relevant across a wide variety of scenarios but has reached mixed conclusions regarding this.
In this chapter, I conduct a theoretical investigation to shed light on this fundamental
question that, arguably, any firm in any industry that employs a salesforce faces (and, in
a recent review article, Coughlan and Joseph (2012) list as a very important yet under-
researched issue in salesforce management): What time horizon should the firm use to eval-
uate and compensate the salesperson, and what should be the associated contract? Should
the firm offer multiple sequential short time horizon contracts (which enables the firm to
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have more control over the effort exertion of the salesperson in every period) or should it
offer a long time horizon contract (which allows the salesperson more freedom to adjust his
effort profile to “game” the system but also allows the firm to make variable compensation
contingent on an outcome that is more difficult to achieve)? What are some key factors that
influence this decision? Furthermore, what effort profile(s) will be induced by the optimal
incentive contract, and does effort postponement by the agent always hurt the principal?
To answer these questions, I build a stylized principal-agent model in which a firm in-
teracts with a salesperson for two time periods. In this context, using short time horizon
evaluation implies offering two period-by-period contracts where each contract is determined
at the start of a period and pays at the end of the period based on the outcome of the pe-
riod. On the other hand, using long time horizon evaluation implies offering a two-period
contract that is determined at the start of the first period and pays once at the end of the
second period based on the outcomes of the two periods. I do not allow renegotiation under
long-term contracting, and I will show that the ability to commit to a long-term contract
makes the optimally chosen long-term contract outperform the optimally chosen short-term
contract for the principal. (In the rest of the dissertation, I will use “long time horizon con-
tracting” interchangeably with “two-period contract,” and “short time horizon contracting”
interchangeably with “period-by-period contracts.”)
I assume the demand outcome in each period to be stochastically dependent on the
effort exerted in that period, and assume the demand outcomes in the two periods to be
independent of each other. In the two-period contract, the agent can dynamically adjust
his effort level in the later period based on the early period’s demand outcome which also
influences his first-period effort exertion decision. I assume that the firm and the salesperson
are risk neutral, and that the agent has limited liability. Limited liability can be thought of
as protection from downside risk for the salesperson, i.e., he will be guaranteed a minimum
payment even in the case of an unfavorable market outcome (which is a robust feature of
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real-world compensation plans). I assume that the agent’s limited liability can be lower or
higher than his outside option; the latter can happen, for instance, when the salespeople’s
skills are most valuable in a sales context and they cannot expect comparable compensation
in other professions (Kim 1997, Oyer 2000).
My analysis shows that, for the firm, a fully flexible two-period contract weakly domi-
nates a period-by-period contract, as expected. Interestingly, however, I find that the two-
period contract, even though it allows gaming of effort by the agent, strongly dominates the
period-by-period contract under certain conditions. In the optimal two-period contract it
is sufficient to determine compensation based on the cumulative sales for the two periods
and, under different conditions (discussed shortly), the optimal two-period contract is either
an “extreme” contract that concentrates the reward only at the highest cumulative output
level, or a “gradual” contract with rewards at all cumulative output levels. In fact, similar to
Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), the optimal gradual two-period contract can be interpreted
as identical to a commission contract. Furthermore, I obtain an interesting equivalence re-
sult that states that the optimal two-period gradual (commission) contract is identical in all
ways (i.e., in terms of expected effort exertion, sales outcomes and total compensation) to the
optimal period-by-period contract which is quota based; in other words, a long time horizon
contract with commissions achieves the same outcomes as a short time horizon contract with
quotas.
Whether the extreme long time horizon contract or the gradual long time horizon contract
(equivalently, a sequence of short time horizon extreme contracts) is optimal can be explained
by understanding the two familiar countervailing effects at play. The first is the beneficial
“incentive effect,” which is that, given the agent’s limited liability, an extreme plan provides
a larger incentive to work compared to a gradual plan because any output lower than the
highest possible does not provide any additional reward. However, the extreme plan also
leads to a negative “gaming effect,” that is, dynamic gaming of effort in the second period
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based on the outcome of the first period hurts the principal. The extreme contract is optimal
when the incentive effect is stronger than the gaming effect, and this is the case when the
effectiveness of the agent’s effort is either low or high. This is because in the extreme contract
the loss in demand due to the gaming effect is larger for higher effort effectiveness, but in
the optimally designed contract the probability that this loss will happen is lower for higher
effort effectiveness. Therefore, the expected demand loss due to the gaming effect in the
extreme contract is highest for intermediate effectiveness levels, and this loss is large enough
to offset the incentive effect, so that in this region the extreme contract is not optimal. As
limited liability decreases (fixing the agent’s outside option) the friction from moral hazard
becomes smaller and the incentive effect becomes less important, so that the gradual contract
becomes optimal in a larger parameter space.
In terms of the agent’s effort exertion, we find that multiple effort exertion profiles are
possible under different conditions under the optimal contract — effort exertion in both pe-
riods; effort exertion in the first period and conditional effort exertion in the second period;
and no effort exertion in the first period and conditional effort exertion in the second period.
The last pattern is especially interesting as it implies that in the optimal contract the firm
induces effort postponement (or “hockey stick” effort profile). This effort postponement is
typically interpreted negatively (Chen 2000), and as something to avoid; our analysis shows
that it indeed can be generated under an optimal contract even with independent periods,
and this happens when limited liability is intermediate. This implies that one has to care-
fully understand and consider the setting and environmental factors when making inferences
about contract efficiency from dynamic effort profiles of agents.
Next, I extend my basic model such that the two time periods are not completely inde-
pendent. Specifically, I introduce the idea of an exogenous and limited amount of product
inventory that has to be sold in the two periods, such that the contract design decisions for
the principal in the two time periods become dependent. (Note that demand outcomes in
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the two periods are still independent.) I assume that under the period-by-period contract,
an agent chooses his action in a period only based on the current period’s contract. Under
this assumption, in this scenario the principal may find it optimal to use a period-by-period
contract in which the second-period contract is decided based on the outcome of the first
period. Such a period-by-period contract can strongly dominate the two-period contract
because it gives the principal more flexibility in adjusting the contract. This cannot be re-
produced by a two-period contract under the assumption that contract terms do not depend
on inventory levels. Furthermore, with limited inventory, the principal’s incentive to induce
effort in the first period is lesser, i.e., the principal may optimally desire effort postponement
by the agent in a larger parameter space.
A number of papers, including Oyer (1998), Steenburgh (2008), Misra and Nair (2011),
Jain (2012), Chung et al. (2014) document another kind of gaming (in addition to effort
gaming) in a dynamic incentives setting — they show that in a multi-period setting with
non-linear contracts, sales agents pull in orders from future periods if they would otherwise
fall short of a sales quota in one cycle, whereas they push out orders to the future if quotas
are either unattainable or have already been achieved. I extend my basic model to study
such strategic sales pull in and push out behavior, which also introduces dependence between
the periods. Allowing this affects period-by-period contracts because it gives the agent more
freedom to game the system. In accordance with this insight, I find that if sales pull in
and push out is possible then a long time horizon contract becomes more attractive to the
principal, because it evaluates the agent only for the output at the end of the two periods.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I present the basic model
with independent time periods. In Section 3.3, I analyze this model and obtain my key
insights regarding the different forces at play, and the comparison between period-by-period
and two-period contracts. In Section 3.4, I allow for periods to be dependent by assuming
that the principal has limited inventory to be sold in the two periods. In Section 4.6, I
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conclude with a discussion. The proofs for the results in Section 3.3 are provided in the
Appendix, and those for the results in Section 3.4 are provided in the Online Appendix.
3.2 Model
I develop a simple agency theoretic model in which a firm (the principal) hires a salesperson
(the agent) to exert demand-enhancing effort. There are two time periods denoted by t ∈
{1, 2}. Demand in both periods is uncertain and independent. Let Dt be the demand
realization in period t, which can be either H or L with H > L > 0. The agent’s effort
increases the probability of realizing high demand levels. The effort level in period t, denoted
by et, can be either 1 or 0, i.e., the agent either “works” or “shirks” in each period; however,
the principal does not observe the effort level. We can think of effort level 0 as a salesperson
making a client visit (which is observable and verifiable) and effort level 1 as the salesperson’s
additional effort spent in talking to and convincing the client to make the purchase (which
the firm cannot observe or verify). Without effort exertion (et = 0) demand is realized as
H with a probability of q, and with effort exertion (et = 1) this probability increases to p
(0 < q < p < 1). A larger p implies greater effectiveness of the salesperson’s effort, while
q can be interpreted as the natural market outcome. I assume that all the demand created
can be met and each unit sold gives a revenue of 1 and has a marginal cost of zero. The cost
of effort is given by φ > 0 for et = 1 and is normalized to zero for et = 0.
I assume that both the firm and the salesperson are risk neutral. Unlike the firm, how-
ever, the salesperson has limited liability, implying that he must be protected from downside
risk. Specifically, I assume that the salesperson has a limited liability of K in each period,
i.e., to employ the agent for one period, the principal must guarantee a compensation of
at least K under any demand outcome. Limited liability is a widely observed feature of
salesforce contracts in the industry, and this assumption is a standard one in the literature
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(cf. Laffont and Martimort 2009; examples in the salesforce literature include Sappington
1983, Park 1995, Kim 1997, Oyer 2000, Simester and Zhang 2010, Dai and Jerath 2013).
The limited liability assumption also implies the existence of a wage floor to the salesperson,
which is aligned with industry practice. I assume that the salesperson’s reservation utility is
U for each period, and that the limited liability can be either lower or higher relative to the
agent’s reservation utility. For instance, if the salesperson’s alternative employment oppor-
tunities are attractive, then limited liability can be relatively low compared with reservation
utility, but if salespeople’s skills are most valuable in a sales context and they cannot expect
comparable compensation in other professions, then limited liability can be relatively high
compared with reservation utility (as also discussed in Kim 1997, Oyer 2000).
The agent is reimbursed for effort using an incentive contract. Effort is unobservable to
the firm and demand is random but can be influenced by effort, so the firm and the agent
sign an outcome-based contract. The firm can propose a disaggregate contract, i.e., two
period-by-period contracts, where each contract is determined at the start of each period
and pays at the end of the period based on the outcome of the period. Alternatively, the
firm can propose a single aggregate two-period contract that is determined at the beginning
of the first period and pays once at the end of the second period based on the outcomes
of the two periods.1 I assume that under a period-by-period contract, an agent chooses his
effort level during a period only based on the current period’s contract, and I do not allow
renegotiation under the two-period contract.
1The discrete demand distribution that I have assumed ensures that effort will not change the support of
the demand distribution; otherwise, the principal may be able to infer the agent’s effort from the demand
outcome and would induce the agent to work by imposing a large penalty for demand outcomes that cannot





I start by presenting the first-best solution (for instance, if the agent’s effort is observable).
In this case, the two periods are independent and equivalent and it is sufficient to study just
one period. The firm can implement any effort level et in either period, by reimbursing the
agent a fixed salary st which must be at least K while ensuring the agent’s participation.




s.t. UA(et) ≥ U (PCt)
st ≥ K (LLt)
Here, (PCt) is the agent’s participation constraint, where UA(et) stands for the salesperson’s
expected net utility on exerting effort et, which is equal to st − φ if the agent exerts effort
and is equal to st if the agent does not exert effort. It states that to employ the sale agent,
the principal needs to provide a fixed salary that makes the agent’s expected net utility from
exerting effort et no less than his outside option, which simplifies as st ≥ U + φ if effort is
exerted, and as st ≥ U if effort is not exerted. (LLt) stands for the agent’s limited liability
constraint, which ensures that the agent receives a fixed salary st no less than his limited
liability K.
If the contract specifies effort exertion in period t ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., et = 1, the principal’s
expected profit is equal to the expected market demand subject to the agent’s effort exertion,
pH + (1 − p)L, minus the minimal salary to ensure effort exertion, max{U + φ,K}, i.e.,
pH + (1− p)L −max{U + φ,K}. If et = 0, the principal gets the natural market outcome
























Figure 3.1: First-best Contract Outcomes
This leads to the following first-best solution (the proof is in Section A1.1 in the Appendix).
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal First-Best Solution) The first-best contract and outcomes
are as per the following table.
U −K H − L e∗FB s∗FB
U −K ≥ 0 H − L ≥ φ
p−q U + φ
−φ ≤ U −K < 0 H − L ≥ φ
p−q +
U−K
p−q 1 U + φ
U −K < −φ H − L ≥ 0 K
U −K ≥ 0 H − L < φ
p−q 0 U




In the table in Proposition 3.1, the first column gives the condition on U −K, the second
column gives the condition on H − L, the third column gives the effort exertion under the
optimal salary, and the fourth column gives the optimal salary. Figure 3.1 depicts the first-
best solution with respect to the range of the demand distribution (H − L), the agent’s
effectiveness parameter (p− q), and the agent’s outside option relative to his limited liability
(U−K). From Figure 3.1, we can infer that the principal would like the agent to exert effort
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when the upside market potential is large, or when the effectiveness of the agent’s effort is
high, or when the agent’s limited liability is large relative to his outside option.
Intuitively, the firm would like to direct the salesperson to work hard if and only if the
increase in the expected demand subject to the agent’s effort exertion (given by (p−q)(H−L))
outweighs the marginal cost for soliciting effort (given by max{U + φ,K} − max{U,K}).
When limited liability is low relative to the agent’s outside option (given by K ≤ U),
the principal only needs to compensate the agent for his outside option plus cost of effort.
Therefore the additional cost for soliciting effort is φ, and the principal solicits effort exertion
if and only if H − L ≥ φ
p−q . When limited liability is intermediate (i.e., U < K ≤ U + φ),
even if the principal does not solicit effort, she still has to pay the agent his limited liability,
so the additional cost for soliciting effort becomes φ + U −K. In this case as K increases,
the additional cost for soliciting effort decreases, thus the principal solicits effort in a larger
parameter space. When limited liability increases beyond U+φ, the principal pays the agent
his limited liability regardless of effort levels and there is no additional cost for soliciting
effort, therefore, the principal instructs the agent to exert effort given any H ≥ L. The
above arguments give the following counterintuitive result.
Corollary 3.1 In the first-best scenario, as limited liability increases the principal solicits
effort in a weakly larger parameter space.
3.3.2 Period-by-Period Contract
In this scenario, the principal specifies a one-period contract at the beginning of the first
period, and then specifies another one-period contract at the beginning of the second period.
The effort for each period is rewarded separately, and therefore I call this a disaggregate
contract. As the two periods are identical and independent, it is sufficient to study just one
period.
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Consider the problem for period t ∈ {1, 2}. Since demand follows a binomial distribution,
the principal offers quota-bonus contracts with quota levels χt ∈ {H,L} and bonuses bχt,t ≥
0, where the bonus bχt,t is paid to the salesperson if and only if the sales reach the quota χt,
together with a fixed salary of st. Indeed, it suffices for the principal to consider only two
of the decision variables. Without loss of generality, I normalize bL,t to 0 and simplify the
notation of bH,t as bt, i.e., the principal does not issue bonus when the demand outcome is L




E[Dt|et]− E[st + bt|et]
s.t. UA(et) > UA(e˜t) (ICt)
UA(et) ≥ U (PCt)
st, st + bt ≥ K (LLt)
The participation constraint (PCt) and the limited liability constraint (LLt) can be
interpreted in a similar way as in the first-best scenario. In addition, the contract needs
to satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint (ICt), which states that to induce effort et,
the principal needs to ensure that the agent gains a higher net utility by exerting effort et
compared with a different effort level e˜t.
Before solving the optimal contract for the principal, I first derive the best contract for
the principal to induce any given effort level. To implement et = 1, from the incentive
compatibility constraint (ICt), the principal needs to set bH,t satisfying st + pbt − φ ≥
st + qbt, which simplifies into bt ≥ φp−q . The participation constraint (PCt) requires that
the agent’s expected utility from exerting effort no lower than his reservation utility, that is,
st + p
φ
p−q − φ ≥ U . To meet the limited liability constraint (LLt) we need the guaranteed






























Figure 3.2: Optimal Period-by-period Contract
et = 1, the principal offers a fixed salary st = max{K,U − q φp−q}, and a bonus bt = φp−q if
the demand outcome is high. To implement et = 0, it is enough for the principal to only
offer the agent a fixed salary st = max{K,U}. The overall solution to the optimal period-
by-period contract is specified in the following proposition (the proof is in Section A1.2 in
the Appendix).
Proposition 3.2 (Optimal Period-by-Period Contract) The optimal period-by-period
contract and outcomes are as per the following table.
U −K H − L e∗t s∗t b∗t
U −K ≥ q
p−qφ H − L ≥ φp−q U − qp−qφ φp−q
0 ≤ U −K < q
p−qφ H − L ≥ p(p−q)2φ− U−Kp−q 1 K φp−q




U −K ≥ q
p−qφ H − L < φp−q U 0
0 ≤ U −K < q
p−qφ H − L < p(p−q)2φ− U−Kp−q 0 U 0
U −K < 0 H − L < p
(p−q)2φ K 0
Figure 3.2 depicts the optimal period-by-period contract with respect to the range of the
demand distribution (H − L), the agent’s effectiveness parameter (p − q), and the agent’s
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reservation utility relative to his limited liability (U −K). In Region I, the principal does
not want to induce effort even in the first-best scenario. In Region II, the principal wants to
induce effort in the first-best scenario but not in the period-by-period contracting scenario.
In Region III, the principal wants to induce effort in the period-by-period scenario. Note
that when limited liability is relatively small (K ≥ U − q
p−qφ), even if effort is unobservable,
the principal can still achieve the first-best solution by penalizing the agent for low demand
realization and rewarding the agent for high demand realization. As limited liability increases
beyond U − q
p−qφ, the principal cannot pay the agent less than his limited liability when
demand realization is L, therefore the first-best solution is no longer achievable. This leads
the principal to induce effort in a smaller parameter space as limited liability increases.
When limited liability exceeds U , the agent needs to be guaranteed his limited liability, with
or without a bonus to induce effort. Therefore, the principal induces effort if and only if
the extra cost for inducing effort p
(p−q)2φ is offset by the increase in expected demand from
exerting effort (H−L)(p−q). From Figure 3.2, we can see that as limited liability increases,
while in the first-best scenario the principal solicits effort in a weakly larger parameter space
(as per Corollary 3.1; represented by the dashed line), with unobservable effort she will
induce effort in a weakly smaller parameter space (represented by the solid line).
3.3.3 Two-Period Contract
In this scenario, the firm proposes a two-period contract at the beginning of the first period
and pays once at the end of the second period based on the outcomes of the two periods.
The timeline of the game is as follows. At the beginning of period 1, i.e., T = 1, the principal
proposes the contract and the agent decides whether or not to accept the offer. If accepted,
the agent then decides on his effort in the first period, e1. At the end of T = 1, the agent and
the principal observe the demand outcome for the first period, D1. The agent then chooses
his second period effort e2. At the end of T = 2, the agent and the principal observe the
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second period demand outcome D2. The agent then gets paid according to the contract.
A key feature of this scenario introduced due to unobservability of effort and the contract
paying at the end of two periods is that the agent can “game” the system — the agent can
choose effort in period 2 based on the outcome of period 1 (and, realizing this, can also choose





where the second period’s effort eD12 is contingent on the first period’s demand realization,
D1.
In full generality, this contract involves a guaranteed salary for employing the agent for
two periods, plus a bonus issued at the end of the two periods that is contingent on the
whole history of outputs. I denote the fixed salary as S, and denote the bonus paid at
the end of T = 2 by b2(D1, D2). Such a contract thus stipulates four possible bonuses,
b2(L,L), b2(L,H), b2(H,L) and b2(H,H). To prevent the agent from restricting sales to L
when demand is H, I impose a constraint on the two-period contract given by b(H,H) ≥
max{b(H,L), b(L,H)}, i.e., the bonus paid when demand in both periods is realized as H
should be no lower than that paid when demand in only one of the periods is realized as H.
Under this constraint, I obtain the following lemma (the detailed proof is in Section A1.3.1
in the Appendix).
Lemma 3.1 When the two periods are independent of each other, in the weakly dominant
two-period contract, b2(H,L) = b2(L,H).
Lemma 3.1 implies that it is sufficient for the principal to pay the agent at the end of
two periods a bonus according to cumulative sales (which can be 2L,H + L or 2H) and
independent of the sales history.2,3 I denote the fixed salary by S, normalize the bonus
2Only the contract to induce (0, 1 − q) is history-dependent, but I find it suboptimal for the principal
when the two periods are independent. However, in Section 3.4, I will show that such a history-dependent
contract can be optimal when the two periods become dependent.
3The lemma holds without discounting and with risk neutral agents. As shown by Spear and Srivastava
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payment when the total sales are 2L as 0, denote the bonus payment when the total sales
across two periods are H +L by B1, and denote the bonus payment when the total sale are
2H by B2. I formulate the principal’s problem as follows.
max
S,B1,B2
E[D|e1, eH2 , eL2 ]− E[S +B1 +B2|e1, eH2 , eL2 ]
s.t. UA(e
H

















2 ) ≥ 2U (PC)
S, S +B1, S +B2 ≥ 2K (LL)
(ICH2 ) stands for the agent’s incentive compatible constraint in the second period following
D1 = H, where UA(e
H
2 ) represents the agent’s net payoff in Period 2 upon exerting effort e
H
2 .
If the agent exerts effort, he will get S+B2−φ with probability p and S+B1−φ otherwise;
without exerting effort, he will get S + B2 with probability q and S + B1 otherwise. To
induce eH2 , the principal needs to ensure that the agent gets a higher payoff upon exerting
effort eH2 , compared with a different effort level e˜
H
2 . Similarly, (IC
L
2 ) stands for the incentive
compatible constraint for inducing effort level eL2 in the second period following D1 = L.
Then, (IC1) represents the incentive compatible constraint in the first period. UA(e1|eH2 , eL2 )
denotes the agent’s net payoff across two periods upon exerting e1 in the first period, given
that the agent is induced to exert effort (eH2 , e
L
2 ) in the second period. If e1 = 1, his total
net payoff will be UA(e
H
2 ) − φ with probability p and UA(eL2 ) − φ otherwise; if e1 = 0, his
total net payoff will be UA(e
H
2 ) with probability q and UA(e
L
2 ) otherwise. To induce e1,
the principal needs to ensure that the agent gets a higher total net payoff on exerting e1,
(1987) and Sannikov (2008), if agents discount their future utility, or if the agent is risk averse, a path-
dependent contract can be optimal.
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compared with a different effort level e˜1. The participation constraint (PC) and the limited
liability constraint (LL) are similar to that in the period-by-period case, except for that I
multiply the right-hand sides by two under a two-period contracting.
To arrive at an optimal contract for the principal, it is crucial to understand how the
agent’s effort profile in the two periods changes with the bonuses B1 (provided for H + L)
and B2 (provided for 2H) in the two-period contract. The following lemma describes this
effort profile (the proof is immediate from the proof of Lemma 3.1).4 Note that since e2
depends on D1, which is random, I write e2 in terms of its expectation value. For instance,
if the agent exerts effort in period 1 and will exert effort in period 2 only if the outcome in
period 1 is H, then e2 = 1 with probability p, so I write this effort profile as (1, p).
Lemma 3.2 (Agent’s Response to Two-period Contract) Given B1 and B2, the
agent’s expected effort profile (e1, E[e2]) is as per the following table.
(B1, B2) (e1, E[e2])
B1 ≥ φp−q , B2 −B1 ≥ φp−q (1, 1)
0 ≤ B1 < φp−q , pB2 + (1− p− q)B1 ≥ φp−q + φ (1, p)
B2 −B1 < φp−q , qB2 + (1− p− q)B1 ≥ φp−q − φ (1, 1− p)
B2 −B1 ≥ φp−q , pB2 + (1− p− q)B1 < φp−q + φ (0, q)
B1 ≥ φp−q , qB2 + (1− p− q)B1 < φp−q − φ (0, 1− q)
0 ≤ B1 < φp−q , 0 ≤ B2 −B1 < φp−q (0, 0)
Figure 3.3 illustrates Lemma 3.2 graphically. The x-axis, B1, is the incremental reward
when total sales increase from 2L to H + L; the y-axis, B2 − B1, is the incremental reward
when total sales increase from H + L to 2H. If both rewards are small, there is no effort
exertion in either period, denoted by e = (0, 0), which is Region I. If both rewards are large,


















Figure 3.3: Agent’s Response to Two-period Contract
the agent will put in effort in both periods, i.e., e = (1, 1), which is Region IV. For other
regions, the effort exertion decisions are more involved. If the agent does not secure the
bonus B1 after period 1 with the demand outcome L, he will not expend additional effort if
B1 ≤ φp−q . If the agent secures the bonus B1 after period 1 with the demand outcome H, he
will not expend additional effort if B2−B1 ≤ φp−q . In other words, B1 and B2−B1 motivate
the agent to exert effort in the second period if demand in the first period turns out to be L
and H, respectively. Furthermore, the agent’s effort exertion at T = 1 depends on the valus
of both B1 and B2 − B1. In Regions II and VI, the agent does not work in period 1 and
chooses to “ride his luck” in period 1. However, in Region II, he works in period 2 if the
demand outcome is unfavorable, i.e., L, in period 1, and in Region VI, he works in period
2 if the demand outcome is favorable, i.e., H, in period 1. In Regions III and V, the agent
works in period 1. However, in Region III, he works in period 2 if the demand outcome
is unfavorable, i.e., L, in period 1, and in Region V, he works in period 2 if the demand
outcome is favorable, i.e., H, in period 1.
I now determine the optimal compensation plan for the firm. I find the optimal contract
by balancing the expected revenue E[D] less the expected compensation cost E[S+B1 +B2].
Proposition 3.3 characterizes the optimal two-period contract for the principal (the detailed
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proof is in Section A1.3.2 in the Appendix).
Proposition 3.3 (Optimal Two-period Contract) The optimal two-period contract
and outcomes are as per the following table.
Region U −K H − L (e1, E[e2]) S∗ B∗1 B∗2
U −K ≥ q2
2(p−q)φ H − L < φp−q 2U
I pq
2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q
2
2(p−q)φ H − L < p(p−q)2φ− U−Kq(p−q) (0, 0) 2U 0 0
0 ≤ U −K < pq2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ H − L < p
2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p)(p−q) 2U




2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q2(p−q)φ φp−q ≤ H − L < p+(p−q)
2










(p−q)2φ− U−Kq(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1+p−2q)(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ 2K
q
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < qp−qφ φp−q ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q) , or, 2U − qp−qφ
III q
2
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q2(p−q)φ p+(p−q)
2
(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p−q)(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, or, (1, p) 2K 0 1+p−qp(p−q)φ
pq2




(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, or, 2K
0 ≤ U −K < pq2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ
p2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p)(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, or, 2K
U −K < 0 p(1+p−q)
(1+p)(p−q)2φ ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, 2K
U −K ≥ q
p−qφ H − L ≥ φp−q or, 2U − 2qp−qφ
IV q
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < qp−qφ H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q) or, (1, 1) 2K 1p−qφ 2p−qφ
U −K < q
2(p−q)φ H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, 2K
I illustrate the result with the aid of Figure 3.4. The optimal contract is either a “gradual
contract” (in which B1 > 0, i.e., it rewards bonuses at both H + L and 2H) or an “extreme
contract” (in which B1 = 0, i.e., it rewards bonuses only at 2H). In Region I, the principal
does not want to motivate effort. In Region II, the principal finds it optimal to use the
extreme contract to motivate the effort profile (0, q) by giving a bonus B2 =
φ
p−q . In Region
III, the principal finds it optimal to use the extreme contract to motivate the effort profile
(1, p) by giving a bonus B2 =
1+p−q
p(p−q)φ (which is larger than
φ
p−q ). In Region IV, the principal
finds it optimal to use the optimal gradual two-period contract to motivate the effort profile
(1, 1).
To develop the intuition behind these results, I first focus on the case when limited
liability is sufficiently high. Specifically, I assume K = U , in which case the principal pays
a fixed salary of S = 2K for inducing any effort profile. From Figure 3.4, I can see that in





































Figure 3.4: Optimal Two-period Contract
to implement e = (1, p), or the gradual two-period contract with bonus B1 =
φ
p−q , B2 = 2
φ
p−q
to implement e = (1, 1). To understand why, I discuss two effects that are operative, namely
the “incentive effect” and the “gaming effect.”
First, I discuss the incentive effect. In Figure 3.5, I vary p − q, the effectiveness of
the agent’s effort, keeping H − L fixed. Generally speaking, more effective agents require
lower incentives to work because the outcome is a better signal of effort exerted. In line
with this, the expected bonus payments under the extreme contract, (p2 + p − pq) φ
p−q , and
under the gradual contract, 2p φ
p−q , both decrease with p. However, the difference between
them, E[B]gradual −E[B]extreme = p( 1p−q − 1)φ, is always positive, as shown by the solid line
in Figure 3.5. This means that the principal always pays a smaller expected bonus under
the extreme contract than under the gradual contract. Therefore, on the positive side, the
extreme contract benefits from the incentive effect: it provides more effective incentives for
an agent with limited liability, thus saving on the bonus payment for the principal. The
reason behind this is that under limited liability, the principal concentrates compensation at
a high level of sales. In a period-by-period contract the highest level of sales at which reward








Figure 3.5: Incentive and Gaming Effects: The x-axis in the figure varies p− q while keeping
H − L fixed
incentive provision in a two-period contract (even though the reward is given only once).
Another interesting observation from Figure 3.5 is that the incentive effect, as measured by
the solid line, shrinks as p increases. This is because as moral hazard frictions decrease with
more effective agents, so will the comparative advantage of the extreme contract on saving
incentive costs.
However, in a dynamic setting, such a non-linear reward structure will suffer from the
agent’s gaming. As a consequence, on the negative side, the principal obtains less demand
under the extreme contract, as the dashed line in Figure 3.5 illustrates. Mathematically,
E[D]gradual − E[D]extreme = (1− p)(p− q)(H − L) is always positive. As I have mentioned,
due to the non-linear structure of the extreme contract, an agent will game the system by
varying his effort in a dynamic setting. Specifically, the agent exerts effort in the first period,
but if the first period outcome turns out to be L, the agent will give up on effort exertion in
the second period, leading to a demand loss for the principal. Interestingly, as p gets larger,
agents under both contracts generate higher sales, but the difference between the sales they
generate, caused by the gaming effect, takes an inverse-U shape. This is because when p
increases, the demand loss, if it happens, (p− q)(H − L), gets larger, but the probability of
its happening, (1− p), decreases.
Combining the incentive effect and the gaming effect, we can see from Figure 3.5 that if
p− q is small, the incentive effect dominates and the extreme plan outperforms the gradual
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plan — the gaming loss under the extreme contract is relatively small compared with its
advantage in providing incentives. Above a threshold of p − q, the gaming loss becomes
dominant and the gradual contract is preferred by the principal. However, as p−q continues
to increase, the gaming loss begins to decline, rendering the extreme contract better again.
Overall, when p − q is either very small or very large, the incentive effect will be more
significant than the gaming effect and the extreme plan outperforms the gradual plan.
The above analysis is based on the premise that limited liability is sufficiently high. Now
I discuss the optimal contract as limited liability decreases. I fix H − L and p− q at a low
level so that when limited liability is sufficiently high the principal does not want to induce
effort. As limited liability decreases, the friction due to moral hazard becomes smaller, and
the principal starts to motive effort using the extreme two-period contract, which provides
more effective incentives than the period-by-period contract. Since limited liability is still
relatively high in this scenario, the principal only induces eH2 = 1 through a low ultimate
bonus and the full effort profile is e = (0, q) — that is, there is no early effort exertion in
the first period, and there is effort exertion in the second period if the early period realizes
as high. As limited liability continues to decreases further, the principal implements e1 = 1
through a high ultimate bonus and the full effort profile is e = (1, p) — that is, the agent
exerts effort in the first period, and he will continue exerting effort in the second period if
the early period realizes as high. When limited liability becomes small enough, the principal
will implement effort e = (1, 1) using the gradual two-period contract.
Put together, the preceding discussion explains the patterns in Figure 3.4. When limited
liability is not too small (relative to the agent’s outside option), in a market with small
upside demand potential, and with either very inefficient or very efficient salespeople, the
extreme contract performs best for the principal. In other circumstances, it is profitable for
firms to propose a gradual contract to motivate hard work in both periods. Next, I state an
interesting corollary.
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Corollary 3.2 Under a two-period contract with independent sales periods, when the upside
demand potential, the agent’s effort effectiveness and limited liability are all intermediate, the
principal does not induce early effort, and will induce late effort only when the first period’s
demand outcome is high. This leads to a “hockey stick” effort profile from the agent.
The corollary states that, in terms of the agent’s effort profile, we may observe a “hockey
stick” pattern e = (0, q) in the agent’s effort profile in equilibrium, that is, the agent exerts
higher effort in the second period compared with the first period in expectation. This hap-
pens when the limited liability, the demand upside potential, and agent’s effort effectiveness
are all at intermediate levels. In this case, the principal would like to induce effort using an
extreme two-period contract with a low ultimate bonus, which provides the most effective
incentives. In other parameter spaces, early effort exertion is preferred by the principal under
a two-period contract, i.e., e∗1 ≥ E[e∗2], as happens when the optimal two-period contract in-
duces either e = (1, 1) or induces e = (1, p). In Section 3.4, I introduce dependence between
the two periods and show that the “hockey stick” effort profile can be preferred even in a
larger parameter space by the principal in that case.
3.3.4 Comparison between Two-Period and Period-by-Period Con-
tracts
I now compare the outcomes in the period-by-period contract scenario and the two-period
contract scenario from the point of view of the principal. I find, not surprisingly, that the
principal weakly prefers the two-period contract to the period-by-period contract. However,
more interestingly, my analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the principal strongly
prefers a two-period contract over a period-by-period contract (even though the latter gives
the principal more control over the agent’s action while the former allows the agent the
freedom to exert effort to game the contract). Furthermore, with independent periods, a
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two-period contract that rewards bonuses on the basis of the total sales in the two periods
suffices, i.e., achieves the same outcome as a contract that rewards for the full sequence of
outcomes. I obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 In Regions II and III as defined in Proposition 3.3, the principal strongly
prefers a two-period contract over a period-by-period contract.
The reason is that the gradual contract with B1 =
φ
p−q , B2 = 2
φ
p−q is essentially a replicate
of the period-by-period contract. Therefore, whenever the principal prefers the extreme
contract over the gradual contract in the two-period contract, she strongly prefers the two-
period contract over the period-by-period contract. This happens when the effectiveness of
effort of the salesperson is either very high or very low (but high enough that it is worthwhile
to have effort exertion). Also, as the limited liability decreases, the strong preference for the
two-period contract reduces. I also note that the preferred extreme two-period contract may
be the one that pays a small bonus for high sales in both periods, which induces effort only
in the second period if the outcome in the first period (without effort exertion) is high, or it
may be the one that pays a large bonus for high sales in both periods, which induces effort
in the first period and in the second period only if the outcome in the first period is high.
It is noteworthy that I do not allow renegotiation under long-term contracting. If renego-
tiation is allowed, rational agents will anticipate that when the first period demand outcome
is low, the principal will renegotiate the contract at the beginning of the second period to
avoid agents giving up in the second period. This will eliminate the value of long-term
contracting in inducing more effort exertion in the first period (conditional on the same
amount of bonus payment) relative to short-term contracting. This aligns with Fudenberg
et al. (1990)’s result that long-term contracting outperforms short-term contracting for the
principal only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not
otherwise be adopted tomorrow.
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3.3.5 Extension: Sales Push-out and Pull-in between Periods
Salespeople working under quota-based plans may resort to modifying demand in particular
periods to meet quotas in those periods. Oyer (1998) empirically demonstrates the existence
of demand pull-in and push-out between fiscal cycles when salespeople face non-linear con-
tracts. In particular, Oyer (1998) reveals that sales agents will pull in orders from future
periods if they would otherwise fall short of a sales quota in one cycle, whereas they push
out orders to the future if quotas are either unattainable or have already been achieved. I
ignore such sales push-out and pull-in phenomena in previous sections, by assuming that
agents cannot shift sales between two periods. In this section, I relax this assumption and
allow the agents to push extra sales to (or borrow sales from) the later period. While the
two-period optimal contract, which pays at the end, is not affected, the period-by-period
contract, which pays in the interim, is subject to sales push-out and pull-in effects, and thus
has to be reanalyzed. I provide a sketch of the analysis below, with details provided in
Section A1.4 in the Appendix.
In the period-by-period contract, at the end of the first period the agent observes the
actual sales D1 ahead of the principal. He can then strategically push out sales to (or pull in
sales from) the second period, if necessary. The principal only observes the sales level after
the agent’s manipulation, which I denote by D′1, and pays the agent according to D
′
1. For
instance, the principal will observe D′1 = H if D1 = H or if D1 = L, but the agent pulls in
H−L from the second period.5 Likewise, observing D′1 = L may imply that D1 = L or that
D1 = H and the agent pushed out the demand H − L to the second period.
To derive the optimal contract, consider first the principal’s problem at T = 2. Distinct
from Section 3.3.2, the problems of the two periods are dependent. At the beginning of the
5I assume that the agent can pull in at most L from the second period to the first, and I focus on the
case when H < 2L. This ensures that even if D1 = L, the agent can manage to report D
′
1 = H by pulling
in H − L < L from T = 2.
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(0, 0) max{2K, 2U} 0 0 2L 0 0
(0, 1− q) max{2K + p+q−pq
p−q φ, 2U + (1− q)φ} 0 0 H + L−D′1 φp−q (p+ q − pq) φp−q
(0, q) max{2K + pq
p−qφ, 2U + qφ} 0 0 2H −D′1 φp−q pq φp−q
(1, 1− p) max{2K + 2p−p2+pq
p−q φ, 2U + (2− p)φ} H + L q φp−q H + L−D′1 φp−q (2p− p2 + pq) φp−q
(1, p) max{2K + p2+p−pq
p−q φ, 2U + (1 + p)φ} H + L (1− q) φp−q 2H −D′1 φp−q (p2 + p− pq) φp−q
Table 3.1: Optimal Period-by-period Contract with Sales Push-out and Pull-in
second period, a new contract is initiated. To induce a specific effort level in the second
period, the principal will set the second period’s quota level and bonus value based on the





I relegate the details to Appendix A1.4, the result is that to induce (eH2 , e
L
2 ) = (1, 0) the
principal sets χ2(D
′
1) = 2H − D′1, and to induce (eH2 , eL2 ) = (0, 1), χ2(D′1) is set to be
H + L − D′1. In both cases, b2(D′1) = φp−q . This implies that the principal readjusts the
quota level but not the bonus amount to achieve a desired effort profile in the second period.
Anticipating this, if the first period’s quota level is not high enough, agents prefer to pull in
sales to achieve the first-period quota and obtain the first period bonus rather than exerting
effort. To induce e1 = 1, in turn, the principal then sets χ1 high enough (for instance H+L),
such that it becomes impossible for the agent to simply secure early bonuses by pulling in
sales if D1 = L, but it is still achievable in case D1 = H. The fixed salary at each period
is chosen such that each of them is no lower than the agent’s limited liability, and the two
combined together ensures the agent’s participation. In Table 3.1, I summarize the optimal
contract to induce different effort profiles.
Indeed, comparing with Section 3.3.3, the period-by-period contract, in the presence of
sales push-out and pull-in, still performs weakly worse for the principal than the two-period
contract. Namely, it performs the same as the two-period contract for inducing e = (1, p),
e = (1, 1− p), e = (0, q) and e = (0, 0), but it performs worse then the two-period contract
for inducing e = (0, 1 − q) and it fails to induce e = (1, 1). In other words, when the
principal anticipates that agents may push-out and pull-in sales, and agents also realize
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that the principal will respond optimally to it, the principal is unable tp induce consistently
high efforts. As a result, the period-by-period contract is still dominated by the two-period
contract (which is unaffected by sales push-out and pull-in).
3.4 Interdependent Periods: Limited Inventory
Until now, I have assumed that the two time periods are independent of each other (except
for the extension in Section 3.3.5 in which the salesperson’s actions can influence the period-
by-period contracting decision). In this section, I allow the two periods to be dependent on
each other. There may be many ways due to which the periods can be interdependent. I
consider one such way, in which I assume that the principal has a limited amount of product
to sell, such that the demand outcome in the first period can change incentive provision for
inducing demand in the second period. In the model until now, the agent had the incentive
to dynamically adjust his effort; in the model with limited inventory, the principal also has
the incentive to dynamically adjust the contract in the two time periods.
I extend the model by assuming that the principal has limited inventory, denoted by Ω,
to be sold across two periods. The inventory cannot be replenished before period 2 starts
and any demand more than Ω is lost, i.e., actual sales D¯ = min{D1 + D2,Ω}. Therefore,
the two periods become dependent through Ω. I assume zero inventory costs for simplicity.
I keep everything else in the model the same as before. To focus on the interesting cases, I
only consider the case when 0 ≤ U −K ≤ q
p−qφ so that the optimal contract varies with the
agent’s limited liability, and H − L ≥ p
(p−q)2φ so that the market upside potential is large
enough to justify effort induction in both periods given unlimited inventory.
I assume that under the period-by-period contract, the agent chooses his action only
based on the current period’s contract. As I will show later, under this assumption, short
term horizon contracting can strictly dominate long term horizon contracting in certain
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parameter spaces. However, if the agent is fully forward looking under the period-by-period
contract, and can predict how the second period’s contract may change based on the outcome
of the first period, then a long-term contract still weakly dominates a short-term contract.
3.4.1 Period-by-Period Contract with Limited Inventory
Recall that in Section 3.3.2, independence across the two periods implies that the optimal
contract stays the same for t = 1 and t = 2. However, in the presence of limited inventory,
the principal’s decision at T = 2, after observing D1, is affected by the remaining inventory
level Ω − D1. In other words, with limited inventory, the principal’s decision variables
become (s1, s
D1
2 ) and (b1, b
D1
2 ), where she will dynamically adjust contract terms at period 2
depending on the realization of D1 as H or L, and the effort levels induced correspondingly
are (e1, e
D1
2 ). I obtain the following proposition (the proof is in Section A2.2.1 in the Online
Appendix).
Proposition 3.5 (Optimal Period-by-period Contract with Limited Inventory)
With limited inventory, the optimal period-by-period contract and the outcomes are as per
the following table.6
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When the inventory level is high enough (Region IV) and does not lead to a bottleneck,
the principal induces e = (1, 1), consistent with the case without inventory concerns. For a




2 ≡ 2L + p−p
2+pq
(1−p)(p−q)2φ, ω3 ≡ 2L +
p
(p−q)2φ, ω4 ≡ 1+q−p(1−p)(p−q)φ
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smaller Ω (Region III), although e1 = 1 remains, e2 becomes contingent on D1; a successful
first period will cause an inventory shortage later and no extra effort is needed. The expected
effort in the second period thus is the probability of realizing D1 as L, which is 1 − p, and
the resulting effort profile is e = (1, 1 − p). If Ω is further below a threshold (Region II),
the principal abandons early effort induction. This leads to an equilibrium effort profile
e = (0, 1 − q). For a yet smaller Ω (Region I), inventory levels are too low to justify any
effort induction, i.e. e = (0, 0). It is noteworthy that the set of optimal effort profiles
excludes e = (0, 1) and e = (1, 0). I state the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 Under a period-by-period contract with limited inventory, when Ω is inter-
mediate, the principal does not induce early effort, and will induce late effort only when the
first period’s demand outcome is low. This leads to a “hockey stick” effort profile from the
agent.
A key insight is that when the working environment is easy enough for the agent, i.e.,
the total amount of product to be sold, Ω, is small, or H or p is large, the principal has
incentive to induce agents to work only in the late period, i.e., postpone effort.
3.4.2 Two-Period Contract with Limited Inventory
In this case, I solve the firm’s contracting problem by replacing the total demand D by its
truncated value D¯ = min{D1 + D2,Ω}. Note that I assume that compensation cannot be
decreasing in total sales. I obtain the following proposition (the proof is provided in the
Online Appendix).
Proposition 3.6 (Optimal Two-Period Contract with Limited Inventory) With
limited inventory, the optimal two-period contract and the outcomes are as per the following
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table.7
Region Ω U −K (e1, E[e2]) Contract
I [µ2,
q
2(p−q)φ) [2L, ω7 − 2(U−K)(1−q)(p−q)) (0, 0) S = 2U,B1 = 0, B2 = 0
[0, µ2) [2L, ω5 − 2(U−K)p2−q2 ) S = 2U,B1 = 0, B2 = 0
[ q
2(p−q)φ , µ3) [H + L+
1
p−qφ, 2H) S = 2U − qp−qφ,B1 = 0, B2 = 1+p−qp(p−q)φ
III [µ2,
q
2(p−q)φ) [H + L+
1
p−qφ, 2H) (1, p) S = 2K,B1 = 0, B2 =
1+p−q
p(p−q)φ
[0, µ2) [ω5 − 2(U−K)p2−q2 , 2H) S = 2K,B1 = 0, B2 = 1+p−qp(p−q)φ
IV [µ3,
q
p−qφ) [H + L+
1
p−qφ, 2H) (1, 1) S = 2K,B1 =
φ







ω6 − 2(U−K)q(p−q) , ω′6 − 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q)
}
, H + L+ 1







ω6 − 2(U−K)q(p−q) , ω′6 − 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q)
}
) S = 2U − q
p−qφ, b(L,H) =
φ






p−q , H + L+
φ
p−q ) (0, 1− q) S = 2U − qp−qφ, b(L,H) = φp−q , b(H,L) = 0, b(H,H) = φp−q
[µ2,
q
2(p−q)φ) [ω7 − 2(U−K)(1−q)(p−q) , H + L+ 1p−qφ) S = 2K, b(L,H) = φp−q , b(H,L) = 0, b(H,H) = φp−q
Figures 3.6 illustrates the parametric regions with the different effort profiles under the
optimal contract. In Section 3.3.3, I showed that without limited inventory, the optimal
contract is either a gradual contract inducing e = (1, 1) or an extreme contract inducing
e = (1, p) or e = (0, q). In this scenario, if Ω is relatively high, we are in Region IV in which
a gradual contract induces e = (1, 1) or in Region III in which an extreme contract induces
e = (1, p). For a small Ω, we are in Region V in which a gradual contract induces effort
e = (1, 1−p). In this case, the agent still exerts early effort, but will exert effort in the second
period only when the first period’s outcome is L. For a yet smaller Ω, we are in Region VI in
which a history-dependent contract inducing effort e = (0, 1− q) is optimal for the principal.
Under this contract, the principal offers b2(H,L) = 0 and b2(L,H) = b2(H,H) =
φ
p−q . In
this case, the bonus payment is not affected by the first period’s demand outcome, and will
be issued if the second period realizes as H.8 Under such a contract, the agent exerts no
7ω5 = H + L − 1−qp+q (H − L) + p
2+p−pq




6 = 2L +
p+q−(p−q)2
(1−p)(p−q)2φ, ω7 = 2L +
p+q2−pq
(1−q)(p−q)2φ, µ2 ≡ 12
(
(p−pq+q2)








(1− p)(p− q)(H − L)].
8Note that this is the only case where the non-decreasing constraint (that compensation should not be
decreasing in sales) binds in the optimal contract. In particular, to induce eL2 = 1, we need b2(L,H) is at
least φp−q . Given b2(L,H) =
φ
p−q , b2(H,H) cannot be less than
φ































Figure 3.6: Optimal Two-period Contract with Limited Inventory
effort in the first period, and will exert effort in the second period only if the outcome of the
first period is L. This is again the interesting case of the “hockey stick” effort profile with
effort postponement.9
3.4.3 Comparison between Period-by-Period and Two-Period Con-
tracts with Limited Inventory
As a result of limited inventory, the conclusion from the basic model that firms weakly prefer
two-period contracting over period-by-period contracting does not always hold true. Overall,
the period-by-period contract outperforms the two-period contract when limited liability is
very small or very large, since it gives the principal more flexibility in adjusting the contracts
(note that I maintain the assumption that compensation is non-decreasing in sales). I state
the following proposition (the proof is in the Online Appendix).
Proposition 3.7 In the presence of limited inventory, the period-by-period contract and the
9Note that with limited inventory the effort profile (0, q) is not induced under the optimal contract, while


























Figure 3.7: Optimal Contract Comparison under Limited Inventory
two-period contract compare as per the following table; specifically, the principal prefers the
period-by-period contract to the two-period contract in Regions III and IV. 10
Region U −K Ω (e1, E[e2]) Contract
2L < Ω ≤ ω3 − U−K1−q 0 ≤ U −K < q
2
(1+q)(p−q)φ
I 2L < Ω ≤ ω7 − 2(U−K)(1−q)(p−q) q
2
(1+q)(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q2(p−q)φ (1, p) Period-by-period / Two-period
2L < Ω ≤ 2L+ φ
p−q
q
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < qp−qφ
II ω1 − 1p−q (U −K) < Ω ≤ 2H µ3 ≤ U −K < qp−qφ (1, 1) Period-by-period/Two-period
III ω3 − U−K1−q < Ω ≤ ω8 − 1+qp2−q2 (U −K) 0 ≤ U −K < q
2
(1+q)(p−q)φ (0, 1− q) Period-by-period
IV max{ω9 − 2−p(1−p)(p−q)(U −K), ω′9 − (2−p)(U−K)q(p−q) } < Ω ≤ min{ω10 + 2−pp(p−q)(U −K), ω1 − 1p−q (U −K)} µ4 ≤ U −K < qp−qφ (1, 1− p) Period-by-period
ω7 − 2(U−K)(1−q)(p−q) < Ω ≤ H + L+ φp−q q
2
(1+q)(p−q)φ ≤ U −K ≤ q2(p−q)φ
V 2L+ φ
p−q < Ω ≤ H + L+ φp−q q2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < µ4 (0, 1− q) Two-period
2L+ φ
p−q < Ω ≤ max{ω9 − 2−p(1−p)(p−q)(U −K), ω′9 − (2−p)(U−K)q(p−q) } µ4 ≤ U −K < qp−qφ
ω8 − 1+qp2−q2 (U −K) < Ω ≤ 2H 0 ≤ U −K < q
2
(1+q)(p−q)φ
VI H + L+ φ
p−q < Ω ≤ 2H q
2
(1+q)(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < µ4 (1, p) Two-period
ω10 +
2−p
p(p−q)(U −K) < Ω ≤ 2H µ4 ≤ U −K < µ3
Figure 3.7 illustrates the results of the proposition. I now discuss the above results in
greater detail with respect to the agent’s limited liability, keeping Ω fixed at Ω = H − L.
In Region III, where the agent’s limited liability is large, the period-by-period contract
implements e = (0, 1 − q) and performs the best for the principal. This is because, under
10ω8 ≡ H +L+ p
2




9 ≡ H +L− 1−pq (H −L) + p+q+pq−p
2−q2
q(p−q)2 φ, ω10 =
H + L+ 1−pp (H − L)− p+q+pq−2p
2
p(p−q)2 φ, µ4 =
p+q−p2
(2−p)(p−q)φ− (p−q)(1−p)2−p (H − L).
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the constraint that compensation cannot be decreasing in sales (to prevent the agent from
restricting sales) the two-period contract rewards the agent more than the period-by-period
contract when demand outcomes at both periods are H. In Region IV, where the agent’s
limited liability is small, the period-by-period contract implements e = (1, 1−p) and performs
the best for the principal. The two-period contract cannot replicate the period-by-period
contract for inducing e = (1, 1− p), because it suffers from the agent’s dynamic gaming. To
ensure early effort exertion, the principal pays higher bonuses under the two-period contract
when demand outcomes at both periods are H, compared with under the period-by-period
contract. In those scenarios, a period-by-period contract that gives the principal flexibility
to adjust quota levels performs better than a two-period contract. In Region V where the
limited liability is intermediate, the two-period contract induces e = (0, 1 − q) performs
better than the period-by-period contract, since it can provide more effective incentives by
paying the agent for the aggregate at the end of the second period. I also state the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.4 With limited inventory, if the agent’s limited liability is large enough com-
pared to the outside option, the principal induces the agent to delay effort exertion under the
optimal contract, i.e., the “hockey stick” effort profile is optimally induced by the principal.
3.5 Conclusions
Firms employ and reward salespeople over multiple time periods. I address a fundamental
question that arises in this context: Should salespeople be rewarded using period-by-period
contracts that reward for the outcome of each period, or should they be rewarded using a
multi-period contract that rewards for the outcomes over multiple periods? I employ a two-
period repeated moral hazard framework with stochastic demand and unobservable effort,
and assume the agent to be risk neutral with limited liability. I allow the agent’s limited
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liability to be greater than or smaller than his outside option.
I find that a multi-period contract weakly dominates a period-by-period contract but,
interestingly, I find that the former can do strictly better than the latter. The reason is that in
a multi-period contract the firm can reward the salesperson only for more extreme outcomes
as compared to a period-by-period contract, which allows it to incentivize the salesperson
more strongly (the “incentive effect”). Even though the salesperson has the ability to game
the contract by adjusting effort levels strategically across periods (the “gaming effect”), the
incentive effect dominates under certain conditions. I find that the above result holds when
the effectiveness of the salesperson’s effort in terms of inducing demand is either low or high,
but not when it is intermediate. When the effort effectiveness is low, the principal strongly
prefers a multi-period contract that, for a low level of limited liability awards a small bonus
to induce no effort in the early period and conditional effort only in the later period, while
for a higher level of limited liability awards a large bonus to induce effort exertion in the
early period and conditional effort exertion in the later period.
I extend my analysis to a case in which a fixed amount of inventory has to be sold across
multiple periods — this introduces dependence between periods as the principal’s preferred
effort exertion in the later period depends on the outcome of the early period. In this
case, I find that, under the assumption that compensation cannot be decreasing in sales, a
period-by-period contract can strongly dominate a multi-period contract.
I also study the effort exertion profile of the agent. I show that, under different conditions,
the principal may optimally induce different effort profiles which may or may not include
effort exertion in early period. In other words, effort postponement, which is often called
a “hockey stick” effort profile and is typically interpreted as shirking by the agent and
suboptimal for the principal, may actually be optimal for the principal. With independent
periods, this happens when limited liability is small compared to the outside option, which
is a reasonable condition to hold in reality. With dependent periods, effort postponement
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happens even for a larger parameter space (including cases in which limited liability is larger
than the outside option) because, given that only a limited amount of inventory can be sold,
the principal wants to wait for the first period outcome to benefit from the eventuality that it
is high without paying for effort exertion. The optimal effort exertion in the second period is
typically conditional on the outcome of the first period, and may be conditional on demand
being high or low in the first period, depending on the parameters. In summary, I show
that a number of different effort profiles are possible under the optimal contract, and high
effort exertion in every period is actually not always desired by the principal (even without
inventory constraints). Therefore, one has to be careful in making inferences about contract
efficiency from effort profiles of agents (which firms sometimes monitor, or can back out from
data as in Misra and Nair (2011)).
I obtain an interesting and useful interpretation of my model if I impose the restriction
that in a multi-period contract only the total sales at the end of the multiple periods can
be measured. Similar to Kra¨kel and Scho¨ttner (2016), this models a situation in which a
salesperson, within a time period, has the opportunity to sell to multiple potential consumers
one at a time; however, the outcome of each interaction is not observable and only the total
sales at the end are observable. I show that a gradual contract (that rewards for intermediate
levels of sales) or an extreme contract (that rewards only for reaching a large enough level
of sales) may be optimal for the principal in this setting, and that effectiveness of the
salesperson’s effort, degree of limited liability, inventory constraints, etc., will all influence
this. Furthermore, multiple effort profiles may be observed here too in the optimal contract,
including that in which effort is exerted only in the later part of this time period (Chen 2000,
Misra and Nair 2011).
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Chapter 4
Dynamically Motivating a Bold
Action
4.1 Introduction
When faced with a selling task, sales people are often able to balance pursuing a “bold”
action with higher sales potential but also higher variance, and maintaining a “safe” action
with limited sales potential but lower variance. For example, a salesperson may make an
effort to reach out to new customers as well as follow up with existing customers (Godes 2004,
Rubel and Prasad 2015). The former is considered bold for the salesperson, but if successful,
can bring in higher profits for the firm. The latter is considered the safer route, since an
established relationship with customers already exists. This agents’ dynamic shifting between
bold and safe actions can be easily extended to other contexts as well. Fund managers who
need to reach a certain threshold of rate of return at the end of the year may re-balance
their portfolios — between more-risky assets with higher return, and less-risky assets with
lower return — several times throughout the year. Brown et al. (1996) and Chevalier and
Ellison (1997b) find that fund managers appear to act bold late in the year by investing on
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portfolios with greater volatility and try to catch the market, if they are a few points behind.
They also found that fund managers may also have an incentive to play it safe and act more
like an index fund if they are ahead of the market. Researchers may assess whether to keep
pursuing an innovative project, or switch to a mundane project, in order to meet promotion
requirements. In Ederer and Manso (2012)’s experiment, subjects choose between following
tips from the previous manager (i.e., taking a safe action), or explore different locations to
discover a more profitable strategy (i.e., taking a bold action). The variability of action
choices significantly declines over the course of their experiment, suggesting that subjects
act more bold in earlier periods than in later periods.
In spite of many papers that document agents’ dynamic gaming in altering between
acting bold or playing safe under a long time horizon contract, previous research has not
reached a consensus about what format the optimal contract takes to dynamically induce
bold actions. A few papers show evidence that long time horizon contracting with delayed
rewards is more effective in inducing bold actions than short time horizon contracting. Chung
and Narayandas (2017) collaborate with a retail chain at Sweden that sells electronic goods.
They find that less frequent quotas encourage salespeople to act bold and sell more high-
margin products, and pursue fewer incremental sales that are considered safe. Lerner and
Wulf (2007) suggest that the shift from compensating corporate R&D heads using short term
contracting to long term contracting is associated with more heavily cited patents. In other
words, long term incentives encourage researchers to take radical approaches and explore
untested technologies, rather than playing safe and applying existing techniques. Protecting
agents from earlier downside risks under a long time horizon contract can further facilitate
incentivizing bold actions based on both industry practices and empirical evidence. An
article from Wall Street Journal 1 reported that a growing number of companies are explicitly
1https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204010604576594671572584158
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rewarding failure — giving cash prizes or trophies to people who foul up, in order to encourage
creativity. Azoulay et al. (2011) show that under a research grant that tolerates earlier
failures, researchers take more radical inquiries and produce higher-impact work measured
by the number of citations, than a research grant that does not tolerate earlier failures.
Firms usually employ agents for an extended period of time, and a recognized issue is
that if the long-term incentive plan is inherently nonlinear (for instance, the widely popular
quota-bonus plan), agents can dynamically engage in different sales activities based on the
salesperson’s past performance. In other words, with a long-term compensation plan, ac-
cording to the salesperson’s current sales status, a salesperson can decide whether to pursue
the bold transaction that could mean higher sales, or the safe transaction with limited sales
expectation. In this chapter, I ask: How frequently should a firm compensate its sales agents
over the long-term, when the agent can shift between bold and safe actions dynamically over
time? What is the structure of the optimal contract, and what action profiles are induced
by the optimal incentive contract? Finally, does an agent’s dynamic shifting between bold
and safe actions always hurt the principal?
I build a two-period model under the principal-agent framework to approach these ques-
tions. Same as in Chapter 3, a risk neutral firm (principal) hires a risk neutral salesperson
(agent) for two periods. In this context, using a short-term horizon evaluation implies of-
fering two period-by-period contracts, where each contract is determined at the start of a
period and pays at the end of the period based on the outcome of the period. On the other
hand, using a long-term horizon evaluation implies offering one two-period contract that is
determined at the start of the first period and pays once at the end of the second period
based on the outcomes of the two periods. I further assume that the agent has limited
liability, an assumption that has been widely made in previous salesforce literature.
However, unlike Chapter 3, demand in each period is uncertain and can exist at any
of three levels (high, medium, and low). At the beginning of each period, the agent can
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choose to take either the bold action or the safe action. Compared with the safe action, the
bold action has an increased probability of achieving both high and low demand realizations.
Furthermore, the upside potential of taking the bold action is more greater than its downside
risk (relative to the safe action). I focus on the parameter space where the bold action is more
costly for the agent than the safe action, so that the agent’s and the principal’s preferences
over the the bold action (relative to the safe action) are misaligned ceteris paribus. The
agent’s action is unobservable to the principal, and the principal can only observe the sales
outcome in each period.
In general, the principal has three possible ways of inducing the agent to perform the bold
action — rewarding the agent for high demand realization, penalizing the agent for medium
demand realization, or protecting the agent from low demand realization. I find that under
the optimal period-by-period contract, the principal induces the bold action by providing
only an upside reward (i.e., the principal issues a bonus upon high demand realization).
I also find that there are three possible optimal two-period contracts, given different
conditions (discussed shortly). The contract format is determined by how much the firm
wants later actions to depend on earlier outcomes. The “account-balance” contract com-
pensates the agent based on how many times the agent obtains high demand realization,
and induces later actions that are independent of earlier demand outcomes. The “extreme”
contract incentivizes bold actions via a hard-to-achieve quota, and induces later actions that
are heavily dependent on earlier demand outcomes. The “polarized” contract allows agents
to “act bold” and make up sales if demand in the first period is low, and induces later actions
that are moderately dependent on earlier demand outcomes.
My analysis shows that, for the firm, a two-period contract weakly dominates a period-
by-period contract, as expected. Interestingly, however, I find that the two-period contract,
even though it allows for dynamic gaming by the agent, strongly dominates the period-by-
period contract under certain conditions. This can be explained by understanding the two
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countervailing effects at play — the expected bold actions induced, and the expected bonus
payment to induce each bold action. First, making later actions heavily dependent (under an
extreme two-period contract) or moderate dependent (under a polarized two-period contract)
on earlier demand outcomes, pays less bonus to induce a bold action on average, than making
later actions independent of earlier outcomes (under an account-balance two-period contract,
or a period-by-period contract). This is because given the same expected bonus payment,
making later actions heavily and moderately dependent on earlier outcomes incentivizes
more bold actions earlier on. However, making later actions independent of earlier demand
outcomes reduces gaming losses and induces more bold actions.
Therefore, when providing incentives is of a higher order than reducing gaming losses for
the principal, an extreme two-period contract or a polarized two-period contract that pays
less for inducing each bold action leads to higher profits for the principal, compared with a
period-by-period contract (or an account-balance two-period contract). In terms of agents’
action profiles, the firm structures the contract to induce the bold action in the first period,
since it is weakly less costly to induce bold actions in earlier periods than in later periods.
However, if the two periods become independent, for example through a limited level
of inventory to be sold across these two periods, then the period-by-period contract can
strictly outperform the two-period contract, under the assumption that an agent chooses his
action under the period-by-period contract based on the current period’s contract. This is
because, with limited inventory, the principal may not want to induce a bold action in the
latter period, if the first period has a high demand realization. However, taking a bold action
increases the probability of achieving a high demand realization. As a result, the principal has
to compensate the agent more, compared with the period-by-period contract, if she wants
to induce a bold action in the earlier period. This suggests the fully-flexible two-period
contract which compensates the agent based on any possible sales histories cannot perfectly
replicate the period-by-period contract in certain scenarios, if agents are not completely
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forward looking under period-by-period contracting.
This chapter is organized as following. In Section 4.2, I present the basic model together
with key assumptions. In Section 4.3, I first establish the first-best benchmark case, assuming
that the firm can observe the agent’s actions. I then derive the optimal period-by-period
contract and the optimal two-period contract for the principal, respectively. In Section 4.4,
I compare the optimal period-by-period contract and the optimal two-period contract, with
both independent and dependent periods. Section 4.4 demonstrates a scenario in which the
principal cannot perfectly observe the sales outcomes. In Section 4.6, I summarize.
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4.2 Model
In my model, a firm (the principal, referred as “she”) hires a salesperson (the agent,
referred as “he”) for two time periods denoted by t ∈ {1, 2}. Demand in both periods is
uncertain and independent, and can exist at any of three levels (high, medium, and low). For
simplicity, I normalize the medium level of the demand outcome to 0, and keep the high and
low levels of demand outcomes symmetric around the middle level, as d and −d respectively.
Let Dt be the demand realization in period t, then Dt can be d, 0, or −d, corresponding to
the high, medium, and low levels of the demand outcome, respectively.
The agent’s action in period t, denoted by et, can be either 1 or 0, i.e. the agent either
takes the bold action or the safe action in each period. However, the principal does not
observe the agent’s action. We can think of taking action e = 1 as a salesperson reaching
out to new customers, and talking to and convincing the client to make the purchase, and
taking action e = 0 as a salesperson following up with existing customers.
If the agent takes the safe action (et = 0), demand is realized as d or −d, each with a
probability of p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
), and is realized as 0 with a probability of 1 − 2p. If the agent
takes the bold action (et = 1), compared with taking the safe action, Dt is more likely to
realize as d or −d, and less likely to realize as 0. Specifically, the probability that demand
realizes as d increases by h to p+h, the probability that demand realizes as −d increases by
l to p + l, with 0 < l < h < 1
2
− p, and the probability that demand realizes as 0 decreases
by h + l to 1 − 2p − h − l. I summarize demand outcomes under the agent’s two possible
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actions as below,
Dt(e = 0) =

d w.p. p
0 w.p. 1− 2p
−d w.p. p
, Dt(e = 1) =

d w.p. p+ h
0 w.p. 1− 2p− h− l
−d w.p. p+ l
.
Here, h and l can be interpreted as the upside potential and the downside risk, respectively,
of taking the bold action in generating sales (compared with the safe action). Taking action
e = 1 is considered more bold than taking action e = 0 for generating demand, since it has
a larger upside potential and downside risk. A larger h relative to l also implies that taking
the bold action entails larger upside potential than downside risk, and leads to a higher
expected sales outcome than taking the safe action.
I assume that both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. Unlike the firm, however,
the salesperson has limited liability, implying that he must be protected from downside risk.
Limited liability is a widely observed feature of salesforce contracts in the industry, and has
been widely assumed in salesforce literature. The limited liability assumption also implies
the existence of a wage floor for the salesperson, which is aligned with industry practice. I
normalize the agent’s limited liability to 0 in each period, i.e., to employ the agent for one
period, the principal must guarantee a compensation of at least 0 for any demand outcome.
For simplicity, I also normalize the agent’s outside option to 0. To employ the sales agent,
the agent’s expected net utility from engaging in sales activities with the firm should be no
less than his outside option u0.
Finally, I focus on the interesting case that the agent needs to exert more effort in taking
the bold action than the safe action. This is also a natural assumption since the bold action
generates high demand in expectation compared with the safe action. If taking the bold
action is less costly for the agent, then there is no conflict of interest between the principal
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and the agent. The principal will pay the agent a fixed salary equal to his limited liability,
0, to induce the safe action in equilibrium given any parameter space. For this purpose, the
cost of taking the bold action is given by φ > 0 for et = 1 and the cost of taking the safe
action is normalized to zero for et = 0. Furthermore, I assume that all of the demand can
be met, and each unit sold provides a revenue of 1 and has a marginal cost of zero.
The agent is reimbursed for his action using an incentive contract. The agent’s action
is unobservable to the firm, and demand is random but can be influenced by the agent’s
action, so the firm and the agent sign an outcome-based contract. The firm can propose
a disaggregate contract, i.e., two period-by-period contracts, where each contract is deter-
mined at the start of each period and pays at the end of the period based on the outcome of
the period. Alternatively, the firm can propose a single aggregate two-period contract that is
determined at the beginning of the first period and pays once at the end of the second period
based on the outcomes of the two periods. 2 Similar to Chapter 3, I assume that under a
period-by-period contract, an agent chooses his effort level during a period only based on
the current period’s contract, and I do not allow renegotiation under the two-period contract.
4.3 Analysis
4.3.1 First-Best Scenario
I first establish the first-best solution, assuming that the agent’s action is observable. As the
two periods are independent and equivalent, it suffices to study just one period. Because
2The discrete demand distribution that I have assumed ensures that action will not change the support
of the demand distribution; otherwise, the principal may be able to infer the agent’s action from the demand
outcome and would induce the agent to work by imposing a large penalty for demand outcomes that cannot
be obtained under equilibrium action but can be obtained under off-equilibrium actions, as argued in Mirrlees
(1976).
58
moral hazard is absent in the first-best scenario, the firm can implement any action by the
agent et in either period, by reimbursing the agent a fixed salary st which must be at least





s.t. UA(et) ≥ 0 (PCt)
st ≥ 0 (LLt)
(PCt) stands for the agent’s participation constraint, where UA(et) denotes the salesperson’s
expected net utility on taking action et, which is equal to st − φ if the agent takes the bold
action, and is equal to st if the agent takes the safe action. To employ the sales agent, the
principal needs to provide a fixed salary that causes the agent’s expected net utility from
taking action et to be no less than his outside option. This simplifies as st ≥ φ if et = 1, and
as st ≥ 0 if et = 0. (LLt) is the agent’s limited liability constraint. It states that the fixed
salary st that the agent receives is no less than his limited liability.
If the contract specifies that the agent takes the bold action in period t ∈ {1, 2}, i.e.,
et = 1, the principal’s expected profit is equal to the expected market demand associated
with the bold action, (h − l)d, minus the minimal salary to ensure the bold action, φ, i.e.,
(h − l)d − φ. If the contract specifies that the agent takes the safe action, the principal
garners the market outcome associated with the safe action, 0, and also pays the minimal
salary, 0, to employ the salesperson. This leads to the following first-best solution.
Result 4.1 The first-best solution, attainable if the agent’s choice of action is costless ob-
servable, would entail instructing the agent to choose the bold action, and paying a fixed
salary equal to the agent’s cost φ, if and only if h − l > φ
d
. Otherwise, the principal directs
the agent to choose the safe action, and pays 0.
Based on Result 4.1, the firm will direct the salesperson to choose a bold action if and only
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if the increase in the expected demand subject to taking the bold action (given by (h− l)d)
outweighs the marginal cost of soliciting it (given by φ). Intuitively, the principal will want
the agent to take a bold action when its upside potential, h is large enough compared with
its downside risk, l. Result 4.1 suggests that if h = l, the principal will not have incentives
to induce the risky action in any parameter space. To rule out the trivial case in which the
firm is not interested in motivating the bold action in the first-best scenario, I only consider
when h− l > φ
d
for the remainder of this chapter.
4.3.2 Period-by-Period Contract
In this scenario, the principal initiates a one-period contract at the beginning of each
period. The agent’s action in each period is rewarded separately — I call this a disaggregate
contract. Again, it suffices to study just one period, when the two periods are identical and
independent.
Before specifying the principal’s problem, I derive a general condition for inducing the
bold action in a certain period. I denote the agent’s continuation payoff at a certain time
as v(d), v(0), and v(−d), corresponding to the agent’s net utility as derived from backward
induction if demand in the current period realizes as d, 0, and − d, respectively. To induce
the agent to take the bold action, the principal needs to propose a contract that satisfies
(p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ > pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d), i.e.
the agent would obtain a higher expected net payoff from taking the bold action compared
with taking the safe action. Lemma 4.1 summarizes this result.
Lemma 4.1 The agent will take the bold action if the continuation payoffs he is faced with
satisfy v(d)− v(0) > l
h
(v(0)− v(−d)) + φ
h
.
The constraint in Lemma 4.1 can be satisfied either by increasing v(d), reducing v(0), or
increasing v(−d). In other words, in order to induce the bold action, the principal can
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choose to: reward the agent upon high demand realization, penalize the agent upon medium
demand realization, or protect the agent against low demand realization.
Next, I develop the optimal strategy for the principal to incentivize the bold action under
the period-by-period contract. Since demand follows a discrete distribution, the principal
offers quota-bonus contracts with a quota level χt ∈ {d, 0,−d} and bonus bt(χt) ≥ 0, where
bonus bt(χt) is paid to the salesperson if and only if the sales reach the quota χt, together
with a fixed salary of st. The principal’s problem in each period is the following.
max
st, bt(d), bt(0), bt(−d)
E[Dt|et]− E[st + bt(Dt)|et]
s.t. UA(et) > UA(e˜t) (ICt)
UA(et) ≥ 0 (PCt)
st, st + bt(d), st + bt(0), st + bt(−d) ≥ 0 (LLt)
In addition to the participation constraint (PCt) and the limited liability constraint (LLt)
which can be interpreted in a similar way to the first-best scenario, the contract needs to
satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint (ICt). It states that in order to induce action
et, the principal needs to ensure that the agent gains a higher net utility in taking action et
compared with a different action e˜t.
To implement et = 1, from the incentive compatibility constraint (ICt), the principal
needs to set bt(d)− bt(0) > lh(bt(0)− bt(−d)) + φh (based on Lemma 4.1). The participation
constraint (PCt) requires that the agent’s expected utility from choosing the safe action is no
lower than his reservation utility, that is, (p+h)bt(d)+(1−2p−h−l)bt(0)+(p+l)bt(−d)−φ ≥
0. To meet the limited liability constraint (LLt) we need the guaranteed salary to be no
less than the agent’s limited liability. The solution is that, to implement the bold action
et = 1, the principal must offer a fixed salary st = 0, and a bonus bt(d) =
φ
h
if and only if
the demand outcome is d.
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This suggests that, under the period-by-period contract, in order to induce the bold
action, the principal is better off only rewarding the agent for high demand realization, rather
than penalizing the agent for medium demand realization, or protecting the agent against
low demand realization. In other words, rewarding the agent upon a high demand outcome
is the most efficient in motivating a bold action, compared with the other two alternatives.





1−2p } is satisfied
3. The relaxed MLRP property essentially states that the highest demand outcome is the
most reliable indicator of the salesperson taking a bold action. This is sufficient to ensure
that the principal will concentrate all bonus payment on the high demand outcome in order
to induce a bold action in a single period. This important insight is consistent with recent
literature, e.g., Dai and Jerath (2018b).
In order to implement the safe action et = 0, it is enough for the principal to offer the
agent a fixed salary st = 0. Weighing the expected demand versus the compensation cost
for the principal to induce the bold and safe actions, I present the optimal period-by-period
contract in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Optimal Period-by-Period Contract) Under the optimal period-





, the firm induces the bold action by paying a fixed
salary st = 0 and rewarding the agent bt(d) =
φ
h
upon high demand realization. Otherwise,
the firm induces the safe action by the salesperson and simply offers him a fixed salary of
st = 0.



























Figure 4.1: Optimal Period-by-period Contract
Note: φ = 0.01, d = 1, p = 0.3 in the left figure. φ = 0.2, d = 1, l = 0.05 in the right
figure.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the optimal period-by-period contract with respect to the upside
potential h, the downside risk l and the baseline outcome p. In Region I, the principal wants
to induce the safe action in the first-best scenario but not in the period-by-period contracting
scenario. In Region II, the principal wants to induce the bold action in the period-by-period
scenario. From Figure 4.1, we can see that the firm implements the bold action in a smaller
parameter space than in the first-best scenario, conforming to the standard result when
moral hazard exists.
4.3.3 Two-Period Contract
I derive the optimal two-period contract for the firm in this section. A two-period contract
is proposed at the beginning of the first period that pays at the end of the second period
according to the sales realizations across the two periods. The timeline of the two-period
contract is the same as that in Chapter 3. At T = 1, the principal specifies the contract and
then the agent decides whether to accept the offer. If the contract is accepted, the agent
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decides on his action in the first period, e1, and then determines his second period action
eD12 based on the commonly observed demand realization in the first period D1. At the end
of T = 2, the demand outcome D2 is observed by the agent and the principal, and the agent
gets paid based on the contract.
In the dynamic setting featuring unobservable agents’ actions, the contract paying at the
end of two periods implies that the agent can “game” the system by choosing his action
in the later period according to the outcome of the earlier period, and, expecting this,
strategically choose his action in the earlier period. I denote the two-period action profile
by (e1, {ed2, e02, e−d2 }), where the second period’s action eD12 is contingent on the first period’s
demand realization, D1.
In full generality, this contract involves a guaranteed salary to employ the agent for two
periods, plus a bonus issued at the end of the two periods that is contingent on the entire
history of output. I denote the fixed salary as S, and the bonus paid at the end of T = 2 with
B(D1, D2). Such a contract thus stipulates nine possible bonuses, with D1, D2 ∈ {d, 0,−d}.
The principal’s problem is similar to that in the period-by-period case, but the principal has
ten decision variables in this scenario. I formulate the principal’s problem in the following,
max
S, B(D1,D2)
E[D1 +D2|(e1, {ed2, e02, e−d2 })]− E[S +B|(e1, {ed2, e02, e−d2 })]
s.t. UA(e
D1
2 ) > UA(e˜
D1
2 ), ∀ D1 ∈ {d, 0,−d} (ICD12 )
UA(e1|{ed2, e02, e−d2 }) > UA(e˜1|{ed2, e02, e−d2 }) (IC1)
UA((e1, {ed2, e02, e−d2 })) ≥ 0 (PC)
S, S +B(D1, D2) ≥ 0, ∀ D1, D2 ∈ {d, 0,−d} (LL)
(ICD12 ) stands for the agent’s incentive-compatible constraint in the second period fol-
lowing the realization of the first period outcome D1, where UA(e
D1
2 ) represents the agent’s
net payoff in period 2 upon exerting action eD12 . To induce e
D1
2 , the principal needs to ensure
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that the agent gets a higher payoff upon exerting action eD12 , compared with a different action
e˜D12 . UA(e1|ed2, e02, e−d2 ) denotes the agent’s net payoff across two periods upon exerting e1 in
the first period, given that the agent is induced to exert action {ed2, e02, e−d2 } in the second
period. To induce e1, the principal needs to ensure that the agent obtains a higher total net
payoff upon exerting e1, compared with a different action e˜1. The participation constraint
(PC) and the limited liability constraint (LL) are similar to that in the period-by-period
case.
I now determine the optimal two-period compensation plan for the firm. First, for each
action profile (e1, {ed2, e02, e−d2 })) that the firm wants to motivate, I find an optimal scheme
for the firm by minimizing the expected payment. Since the agent needs to decide for four
actions, each of which can take a value of either 0 or 1, there are 16 combinations in total.
I then find the optimal contract by balancing the expected revenue E[D1 + D2] less the
expected compensation cost E[S +B]. Proposition 4.2 characterizes the optimal two-period
contract for the principal (the detailed proof is in Section A2.1 in the Appendix).
Proposition 4.2 (Optimal Two-period Contract)
The optimal two-period contract for the principal is an “account-balance” contract, an









































































Figure 4.2: Account-balance, Extreme, and Polarized Contracts
Based on Proposition 4.2, the optimal two-period contract can take three formats de-
pending on paramter spaces (which I will specify later) — an “account-balance contract”, an
“extreme contract”, or a “polarized contract”. I illustrate the structure of each contract and
the action profile induced with the aid of Figure 4.2.
Under the account-balance contract, the principal finds it optimal to motivate a bold
action in both periods, and does so by rewarding the agent based on the number of times
that Dt realizes as d. Figure 4.2(a) illustrates the account-balance contract. If demand in
only one of the two periods realizes as high, the firm issues bonus B(−d, d) = B(0, d) =
B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h
. If demand in both periods realizes as high, the firm issues bonus
B(d, d) = 2φ
h
, which is twice bonus acquired when demand in only one of the two periods
realizes as high. As a result, the firm manages to induce the agent to take a bold action in
the second period, independent of the first period’s demand outcome.
Under the extreme contract, the principal sets a hard-to-achieve quota 2d and concen-
trates the bonus at B(d, d) = φ
h
, That is, the agent is awarded if and only if demand in
both periods realizes as d, as figure 4.2(b) illustrates. Facing a hard-to-achieve quota, the
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agent is incentivized to act bold earlier on, since if the first period does not have a high
demand realization, the bonus at the end of the second period will become unattainable.
Nevertheless, if demand in the first period realizes as medium or low and the bonus becomes
unattainable, the agent will take a safe action in the later period. As a result, under the
extreme contract, the action induced in the second period is heavily dependent on the first
period’s outcome.
Finally, the polarized contract gives the agent an opportunity to make up sales if the first
period’s demand realizes as −d. Figure 4.2(c) presents that bonus B(−d, d) = φ
h
is issued if
demand in the earlier period realizes as −d and demand in the second period realizes as d.






if demand in both periods realizes
as d. This is a polarized contract since the agent obtains a positive surplus in the second
period if demand in the first period realizes as d or −d, but he obtains zero surplus if demand
in the first period realizes as 0. Under this contract, the agent is incentivized to act bold
in the second period if and only if demand in the first period is not 0. In other words, the
polarized contract induces an action in the second period moderately dependent on the first
period’s outcome.
Before discussing how the optimal contract structure is decided, it is also interesting to
discuss the action induced by the principal under the optimally chosen contract.
Corollary 4.1 Under the optimal two-period contract, the bold action is always induced by




(b) “Extreme” Contract (c) “Polarized” Contract
Figure 4.3: Action Profiles Induced under Account-balance, Extreme, and Polarized Con-
tracts
The above corollary states that, while under a two-period contract, the principal always
prefers the agent to take a bold action in the earlier period. However, unlike the period-by-
period contract, the optimal two-period contract may not always induce the bold action in
the second period. The optimal contract structure is determined by how much the action
induced in the second period depends on the first period’s sales outcomes. If the action
induced in the second period is independent of the first period’s sales outcomes, then an
account-balance contract is optimal. If the action induced in the second period is heavily
dependent on the first period’s sales outcomes, then an extreme contract is optimal. If
the action induced in the second period is moderately dependent on the first period’s sales
outcomes, then a polarized contract is optimal.
In order to explore the intuition behind these results, I discuss the tradeoffs for the






, where E[D] is the expected demand associated with a contract, and
E[B]
E[D]
stands for the bonus payment that is expected to induce each unit of demand. Since
the expected demand is in proportion to the expected number of bold actions induced, a
contract that induces more bold actions and pays less bonus for inducing each bold action,
renders greater profits for the principal.
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First, I find that either the extreme contract, or the polarized contract, pays the smallest
possible bonus payment for inducing each bold action among the three contracts, and the
account-balance contract pays the most among the three contracts. To further understand
this, given a contract, I decompose the final bonus paid into the bonus paid to induce each
bold action within the two periods. The results are given in Figure 4.4. Under the account-
balance contract, the second period’s action is independent of the first period’s outcome.
Therefore, to induce a bold action in each period, the contract pays the same expected
bonus as a period-by-period contract does (given by E[b]). However, under the extreme
contract, the principal pays less bonus to induce the bold action in the first period (given
by (1 − p)E[b]). This is because the first period’s demand outcome has a heavy influence
on the second period’s action. With a hard-to-achieve quota, the agent is more incentivized
to act bold in the first period. This makes it less costly for the principal to induce an early
bold action. Under the polarized contract, the principal pays even less bonus to induce a
bold action in the first period than an extreme contract does (given by (1 − p − p l
h
)E[b]).
The reason is that as the agent is offered a makeup opportunity if the first period demand
is −d, he has more incentives to take a bold action earlier on.
Figure 4.4 highlights that it is weakly less costly to induce bold actions in earlier periods
than in the later periods, since agents’ dynamic gaming can in turn be used by the principal
to save on incentive cost. This is the reason behind why the principal induces the bold
action in the first period under any optimal contract, as Corollary 4.1 states. Furthermore,
although the polarized contract pays the least bonus to induce a bold action in the first
period, it induces more bold actions in the second period (which is more costly than inducing
bold actions in the first period) than the extreme contract. On average, either the extreme
contract or the polarized contract pays the least bonus to induce a bold action. When h




), the polarized contract, relative
to the extreme contract, save more on bonus payment for inducing bold actions in the first
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period (given by p l
h
based on Figure 4.4(a)). When p is small, the polarized contract induces
fewer bold actions in expectation in the second period. In both case, the polarized contract
induces the most bold actions given a fixed level of expected bonus payments. When h is




), the extreme contract induces the
most bold actions given a fixed level of expected bonus payments.
Next, I compare the three contracts in terms of the number of bold actions induced.
It is straightforward that the account-balance contract induces more bold actions than the
polarized contract does, which induces more bold actions than the extreme contract does.
Because the bold action increases variance in sales outcomes, making later actions indepen-
dent on earlier outcomes suffers the least from agents’ gaming. To summarize, the extreme
contract or the polarized contract pays the least bonus in inducing a bold action on average,
by making the second period’s action dependent on the first period’s outcome. The account-
balance contract, on the other hand, induces the most bold actions by making the second



































Figure 4.4: Expected Bonus Payment to Induce Each Bold Action E[B]
E[D]
I am now ready to discuss under what conditions each contract appears as optimal for the
principal. I first present the result with the aid of Corollary 4.2 and Figure 4.5. In Region
I of Figure 4.5, the principal does not want to motivate a bold action. In Region II, the
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principal finds it optimal to adopt an extreme contract than makes the agent’s action in the
second period heavily dependent on the sales outcome in the first period. In Region III, the
principal finds it beneficial to adopt a polarized contract that makes the agent’s action in the
second period moderately dependent on the sales outcome in the first period. In Region IV,
the principal finds it optimal to adopt an account-balance contract that makes the agent’s
action in the second period independent of the sales outcome in the first period.
Corollary 4.2 (Optimal Two-period Contract)
The optimal two-period contract and outcomes are as per the following table.
Region Condition e1 {ed2, e02, e−d2 } Contract Principal’s profits
I h > 1+p
p
l and h− l < d
φ
< K4, or h <
1+p
p
l and h− l < d
φ
< K3 0 (0
d, 00, 0−d) S = 0 0
II h > 1+p
p
l and K4 <
d
φ
< K2; 1 (1




(1 + p+ h)(h− l)d− (1 + h)(p+ h)φ
h
III h > 1+p
p
l and K2 <
d
φ
< K1, or h <
1+p
p
l and K3 <
d
φ
< K1 1 (1
H , 0M , 1L) S = 0, B(−d, d) = φ
h














1 (1H , 1M , 1L) S = 0, B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h
, B(d, d) = 2φ
h
2(h− l)d− 2(p+ h)φ
h
Table 4.1: Optimal Two-period Contract
Note: K1 ≡ p2(h−l)+p(2h2−h)+h2(h+l−1)(2p+h+l−1)(h−l)h2 , K2 ≡ p
2(h−l)+ph2+lh2
(h−l)(p+l)h2 , K3 ≡ p
2(h−l)+p(2h2+h)+h2(h+l+1)
(2p+h+l+1)(h−l)h2 ,


































Figure 4.5: Optimal Two-period Contract
Note: The regions are defined by the solid lines. φ = 0.01, d = 1, p = 0.3 in the left figure.
φ = 0.2, d = 1, l = 0.05 in the right figure.
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To understand the comparative statics, let’s first focus on the scenario where h is small
relative to l, or p is small (i.e., the areas below the dashed lines in Figure 4.5). In this
scenario, the polarized contract pays the least bonus for inducing each bold action, whereas
the account-balance contract induces the most bold actions. The former contract is optimal
when h is extreme, whereas the latter contract is optimal when h is intermediate, since the
gaming loss from the polarized contract is the largest when h is intermediate. Note that the
extreme contract is suboptimal for the principal in this scenario because it does not pay the
least bonus for inducing each bold action, and it suffers the most from agents’ gaming.
When h is large relative to l, or when p is large (i.e., the areas above the dashed lines
in Figure 4.5), the extreme contract pays the least bonus for inducing each bold action. It
becomes the optimal contract for the principal, when the value of h is small or p is large so
that the gaming loss is minimal. Altogether, we can see from Figure 4.5 that the polarized
contract is optimal for the principal when (1) the difference between h and l is small or p
is small, and h is extreme, or (2) when the difference between h and l is large or p is large,
and h is relatively small or large. The extreme contract is optimal for the principal when
the difference between h and l is large or p is large, and h is extremely small. Finally, the
account-balance contract is optimal when l or p is small, and h is intermediate.
The optimal contract I derived above aligns with the contract structure observed in
practice to dynamically induce bold actions. The extreme contract corresponds to a long time
horizon contract with delayed rewards and hard-to-achieve quotas, which is documented as a
higher-powered incentive plan for inducing bold actions (Chung and Narayandas 2017). The
optimality of a polarized contract gives theoretical explanations for why startups and research
entities benefit from protecting agents from earlier low outcomes in order to encourage bold
actions (Tian and Wang 2011, Azoulay et al. 2011).
The implication of agents’ dynamic gaming between bold and safe actions in this chapter
differs from that of effort dynamics in Chapter 3, in two ways. First, since a bold action
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also entails a larger downside risk, a polarized two-period contract that offers makeup op-
portunities can be the most effective in motivating the agent to take the bold action in a
certain parameter space. Second, unlike in Chapter 3, the optimal contract in this chapter
can be history-dependent. For example, the polarized contract does not issue a bonus when
demand in the first period realizes as d and demand in the second period realizes as −d, but
it issues a bonus when demand in the first period realizes as −d and demand in the second
period realizes as d.
In the next section, I compare the outcomes in the period-by-period contract scenario
and the outcomes in the two-period contract scenario, from the point of view of the principal.
4.4 Comparison between Two-Period and Period-by-
Period Contracts
Having derived both the optimal period-by-period and the optimal two-period contract for
the principal, I now discuss whether firms benefit from the disaggregate contract or the
aggregate contract, when the salesperson can game the aggregate contract by varying the
action he takes over time.
4.4.1 Independent Periods
I now compare the principal’s profits under the optimal period-by-period contract and the
optimal two-period contract. I find, not surprisingly, that the principal weakly prefers the
two-period contract to the period-by-period contract. The reason is that account-balance
contract is essentially a replicate of the period-by-period contract. However, further analysis
shows that, under special conditions, the principal strongly prefers a two-period contract over
a period-by-period contract (even though the latter gives the principal more control over the
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agent’s actions while the former allows the agent the freedom to game the contract). I obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 In Regions II and III as defined in Proposition 4.2, the principal strongly
prefers a two-period contract over a period-by-period contract.
In other words, when the action the principal prefers to induce in the second period
is contingent on the first period outcome in association with the two-period contract, the
principal strongly prefers the two-period contract over the period-by-period contract. This
way, the principal can obtain, higher profits than with the period-by-period contract under
certain parametric conditions by setting a hard-to-achieve quota, or offering makeup oppor-
tunities. This happens when the upside potential of the bold action, h is extreme, when the
baseline outcome, p is low, or when the downside risk of the bold action, l is low.
This result is qualitatively the same as the result in Chapter 3, namely, the two-period
contract strictly dominates the period-by-period contract when the effectiveness of an agent’s
effort is extreme. The difference is that in most of the parameter space, the optimally chosen
two-period contract will be a polarized contract that offers makeup opportunities, rather
than an extreme contract with a hard-to-achieve quota (as the extreme contract in Chapter
3 does). I do not explicitly model the sales push-out and pull-in phenomena, as their impacts
will be similar to that in Chapter 3. In particular, if the agents are allowed to push extra
sales to (or borrow sales from) the later period, the two-period optimal contract, which
pays at the end, is not affected. However, the period-by-period contract, which pays in the
interim, is subject to sales push-out and pull-in effects, and will perform even worse relative
to the two-period contract for the principal.
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4.4.2 Interdependent Periods
In the above subsection, I arrived at the conclusion that the principal weakly prefers an
aggregate contract with independent periods. However, this seems contrary to the widely
popular disaggregate contract we observe in practice. In this section, I allow the two periods
to be dependent on each other by introducing the condition that the principal has limited
inventory to sell during the two periods. In the presence of limited inventory, the principal
has an incentive to dynamically adjust the contract within the two time periods. This
interacts with the agent’s incentive to dynamically adjust his actions within the two time
periods. I show that, because of this interaction, there are scenarios where a period-by-period
contract cannot be replicated by the two-period contract, and will be strictly preferred by
the principal.
My analysis in this section is based on the assumption that under the short time horizon
contract, an agent chooses his action in a period only based on the current period’s contract.
However, if the agent acts fully strategically under the period-by-period contract, and chooses
the first period’s action by anticipating how the second period’s contract may change based
on the outcome of the first period, then a long-term contract still weakly dominates a short-
term contract.
Period-by-period Contract with Limited Inventory
I extend my model by assuming that the principal has limited inventory, denoted by Ω, to
sell over the two periods. The inventory cannot be replenished before the end of the second
period and any demand beyond Ω is lost, i.e., actual sales D¯ = min{D1 +D2,Ω}. As a result,
the two periods become dependent through Ω. For simplicity, I assume zero inventory cost.





that a bold action generates enough upside potential to be induced in both periods given
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unlimited inventory.
Unlike in Section 4.3.2, where independence across the two periods leads to the same
optimal contract for the two periods, in the presence of limited inventory, the principal’s
decision at the beginning of the second period, after observing D1, will depend on the
remaining inventory level Ω − D1. Mathematically speaking, given limited inventory, the
principal’s decision variables become (b1(d), b
D1
2 (d)). In the above notation, the bonus offered
in the second period will by dynamically adjusted depending on the realization of D1 as d, 0,
or −d, and the corresponding action induced is (e1, eD12 ). The following proposition presents
the optimal period-by-period contract for the principal (see Section A2.2.1 for the proof).
Proposition 4.4 (Optimal Period-by-period Contract with Limited Inventory)
With limited inventory, the optimal period-by-period contract and outcomes emerge as per
the following table.
Condition (e1, {eH2 , eM2 , eL2 }) Contract
Ω > Ω1 (1, {1H , 1M , 1L}) s = 0, b1(d) = bd2(d) = b02(d) = b−d2 (d) = φh
max{d,Ω4} 6 Ω < Ω1 or max{Ω5,Ω2} 6 Ω < d (1, {0H , 1M , 1L}) s = 0, b1(d) = b02(d) = b−d2 (d) = φh
max{0,Ω6} 6 Ω < Ω2 or Ω7 6 Ω < 0 (1, {0H , 0M , 1L}) s = 0, b1(d) = b2(d) = φh
d 6 Ω < Ω4 or Ω2 6 Ω < min{d,Ω5} (0, {0H , 1M , 1L}) s = 0, b02(d) = b−d2 (d) = φh
0 6 Ω < min{Ω6,Ω2} or Ω3 6 Ω < min{0,Ω7} (0, {0H , 0M , 1L}) s = 0, b02(d) = φh
Ω < Ω3 (0, {0H , 0M , 0L}) s = 0
Table 4.2: Optimal Period-by-period Contract with Limited Inventory
Note: Ω1 ≡ (1 + lh)d+ (1 + ph)φh , Ω2 ≡ lhd+ (1 + ph)φh , Ω3 ≡ ( lh − 1)d+ (1 + ph)φh , Ω4 ≡
dh(h2+h(−1+2p−l)+l)−(−1+ h)(p+h)φ
ph2
, Ω5 ≡ dh((−1+2h)l+p(h+l))+(−1+ h)(p+h)φh(h2+pl+h(−1+2p+l)) , Ω6 ≡
dh((−1+h−l) l+p(h+l))−(p+h) (1+l)φ




























Figure 4.6: Optimal Period-by-period Contract with Limited Inventory
Note: φ = 1, d = 50, l = 0.1, p = 0.26.
When the inventory level is high enough (Region VI) and does not lead to a bottleneck,
the principal induces e = (1, 1), consistent with cases without inventory concerns. For a
smaller Ω, when h is relatively large (Region V in Figure 4.6), although a bold action is still
induced in the earlier period, e2 becomes contingent on D1; high demand in the first period
will cause an inventory shortage later and no bold action is needed. When h is relatively
small (Region III), the principal further abandons inducing a bold action in the early period.
As Ω reduces further, when h is relatively large (Region IV), a bold action is still induced in
the earlier period, but is only induced in the later period if the first period has low demand
realization. When h is relatively small (Region II), the principal abandons inducing a bold
action even in the early period. For a yet smaller Ω (Region I), inventory levels are too low
to justify any bold action. It is noteworthy that the set of optimal action profiles includes
that bold action not be taken in the early period, but may be taken in the second period. I
state the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3 Given a period-by-period contract with limited inventory, when Ω is interme-
diate and h is small, the principal does not induce a bold action in the first period, and may
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induce a bold action in the second period, if the first period’s demand outcome is medium or
low (Region II and III in Figure 4.6).
Two-Period Contract with Limited Inventory
In a similar vein, the firm’s contracting problem can be solved by substituting the total
demand D with its truncated value D¯ = min{D1 + D2,Ω}. I focus on the parameter space
with h > p
1+p




, so that e = (1, {1d, 00, 0−d}) is not within the optimal
action profiles with unlimited inventory. I obtain the following proposition (the proof is in
Appendix A2.2.2).
Proposition 4.5 (Optimal Two-Period Contract with Limited Inventory) With
limited inventory, the optimal two-period contract and outcomes emerge as per the following
table.





















and max{d, ω4} 6 Ω < ω1, or max{0, ω6} 6 Ω < min{d, ω5, ω8} (1, {0d, 00, 1−d}) S = 0, B(−d, d) = φh , B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = (1− p lh)φh
d 6 Ω < ω4 or min{ω2, ω5} 6 Ω < d (0, {0d, 10, 1−d}) S = 0, B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φh
0 6 Ω < min{ω6, ω2} or Ω3 6 Ω < min{0, ω7} (0, {0d, 00, 1−d}) S = 0, B(−d, d) = φh
Ω < Ω3 (0, {0d, 00, 0−d}) S = 0












h2((−1+2p)h+pl) , ω7 =
−dh2((−1+h−l) l+p(h+l))+(p+h) (pl−h(1+l))φ

































Figure 4.7: Optimal Two-period Contract with Limited Inventory
Note: φ = 1, d = 50, l = 0.1, p = 0.26.
The optimal two-period contracts for inducing different action profiles in the presence of
limited inventory are illustrated by Figure 4.7. In this scenario, if Ω is relatively high, we
are in Region VI or VII, where e = (1, {1d, 10, 1−d}) or e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}) is induced. For
an intermediate Ω, we are in Region II, III, IV, V, where no bold action is induced upon a
realization of high demand in the first period. Furthermore, when h is relatively large (as in
Region IV or Region V), a bold action is induced in the first period. When h is relatively
small (as in Region II or Region III), a bold action is not induced in the first period.
Comparison between Two-period and Period-by-period Contracts with Limited
Inventory
I first summarize a comparison between the two-period contract and the period-by-period
contract given limited inventory through Proposition 4.6.
Proposition 4.6 The period-by-period contract may outperform the two-period contract in
the presence of limited inventory, when the principal has an intermediate need and the upside




















Figure 4.8: Optimal Contract Comparison under Limited Inventory
Note: φ = 1, d = 50, l = 0.1, p = 0.26.
To understand the results, we must consider all possible action profiles. Compared with
the period-by-period contract, the two-period contract pays a greater bonus when inducing
e = (1, {1d, 10, 0−d}), e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}), and e = (1, {0d, 10, 0−d}). To summarize, the
two-period contract pays no less of a bonus relative to the period-by-period contract when
both e1 = 1 and e
0
2 = 1 are induced. This is because in order to induce a bold action in
the second period when demand in the first period realizes as medium (i.e., e02 = 1), the
two-period contract needs to reward the agent (in expectation) upon D1 = M . However,
taking a bold action in the first period reduces the probability of obtaining medium demand
realization in the first period. As a result, when the principal aggregates the bonus payment
for the two-period contract, she needs to offer more of a bonus to incentivize taking the bold
action in the first period.
In contrast, the two-period contract pays less of a bonus when inducing e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}),
e = (1, {1d, 00, 0−d}), and e = (1, {0d, 00, 1−d}) compared with the period-by-period contract.
In other words, the two-period contract pays no more bonus relative to the period-by-period
contract, when both e1 = 1 and e
0
2 = 0 are induced. This is because in order to induce the
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safe action when demand in the first period realizes as medium (i.e.,e02 = 0), the two-period
contract does not reward the agent when D1 = 0. As taking a bold action in the first pe-
riod reduces the probability of obtaining medium demand realization in the first period, this
provides greater incentive for the agent to take a bold action in the first period.
Since inducing e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}) can be optimal for the principal when the inven-
tory level is intermediate (based on Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.5), the period-by-
period contract can strictly outperform the two-period contract for the principal when
e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}) is induced (Region I in Figure 4.8). In particular, under the opti-
mal period-by-period contract to induce e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}), b1(d) = φh , suggesting that
when demand in the first period realizes as d, the agent gets rewarded φ
h
. Under the optimal
two-period contract to induce e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}), B(d, d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = (1 + p)φ
h
,
suggesting that when demand in the first period realizes as H, the agent gets rewarded
(1 + p)φ
h
, which is higher than his reward under the period-by-period contract, given by φ
h
.
Similarly, the two-period contract can strictly outperform the period-by-period contract
for the principal when e = (1, {0d, 00, 1−d}) (which can be optimal for the principal to induce
based on Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.5) is induced, as Region III in Figure 4.8 presents.
In particular, to induce e = (1, {0d, 00, 1−d}), under the optimally chosen period-by-period
contract, we have b1(d) =
φ
h
, implying that upon a high demand realization in the first
period, the agent gets rewarded φ
h
. The optimal two-period contract, on the other hand, has




, implying that upon a high demand realization in




. This is lower than the agent’s reward
under the period-by-period contract, given by φ
h
. Finally, in Region II where the inventory
level is relatively high, again, the two-period contract may outperform the period-by-period
contract for inducing e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}), similar to cases with independent periods.
To summarize, due to dynamic gaming on the part of the agent, the two-period contract
cannot replicate the period-by-period contract when a bold action is induced in the first
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period, and is induced again in the second period upon a medium level of demand realization
in the first period. This makes the period-by-period contract perform strictly better than the
two-period contract in the presence of limited inventory. To emphasize, the above analysis is
based on the premise that under the short time horizon contract, an agent chooses his action
in a period only based on the current period’s contract. If the agent acts fully strategically
under the period-by-period contract, and chooses the first period’s action by anticipating
how the second period’s contract may change based on the outcome of the first period, then
a long-term contract still weakly dominates a short-term contract.
The above analyses identify the tradeoffs for a firm to consider in choosing between a
long time horizon contract and a short time horizon contract. A long time horizon contract
provides higher-powered incentives for an agent to take bold actions by inducing later actions
dependent on earlier demand outcomes. Therefore, the firm is better off under a long time
horizon contract if providing incentives is of a higher order. On the other hand, a short
time horizon contract reduces agents’ gaming and provides the principal more flexibility in
adjusting the contracts at interim. As a result, if reducing gaming losses is of a higher order
or there are external factors making the two periods dependent, then a short time horizon
contract may improve the firm’s profits.
Compared with the discussion in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 enables us to gain a full picture
of when the two-period contract can outperform the period-by-period contract and when it
cannot. The assumption that the bold action not only increases the upside potential but
also increases the downside risk is critical in generating this full picture.
4.5 Consideration of Non-Decreasing Constraint
Up to this point, I assume that the principal can perfectly observe sales outcomes. In this
section, I discuss a scenario where the agent can destroy sales, and as a result, the salesperson
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would under-report sales if there is a possibility that this will lead them larger bonuses.
Mathematically speaking, I need to impose a non-decreasing constraint that the agent’s
continuation payoffs at the end of the first period, i.e., after the sales outcome has been
realized but before the agent reports sales to the principal, should satisfy v(d) ≥ v(0) ≥
v(−d). The non-decreasing constraint ensures that the agent does not have an incentive to
under-report the sales outcome in the first period. 4 While the optimal period-by-period
contract is not affected, the two-period contract is subject to the non-decreasing constraint,
and thus has to be reanalyzed. I provide a sketch of the analysis below, with details provided
in Section A2.3.1 in the Appendix.
The principal only observes the sales level after the agent’s manipulation, which I de-
note by D′1, and pays the agent according to D
′
1. To derive the optimal contract, consider
first the optimal contracts I developed in Section 4.3.3. I find that the polarized contract
derived in Section 4.3.3 to induce e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}) does not meet the non-decreasing
constraint. When a makeup opportunity B(−d, d) = φ
h
is offered, the principal needs to
increase the bonus payment corresponding to D1 = 0 (compared with that in absence of
the non-decreasing constraint), to restrict the agent from reporting sales D′1 = −d when the
demand realization is actually D1 = 0. Due to the increase in the expected bonus payment
when D1 = 0, in order to induce the bold action in the first period, the principal needs











. It therefore becomes more costly for the principal to induce e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}) in
the presence of the non-decreasing constraint.
Indeed, due to the non-decreasing constraint, it becomes suboptimal for the principal to
induce e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}). In equilibrium, the principal either induces e = (1, {1d, 10, 1−d})
or e = (1, {1d, 00, 0−d}). The optimal two-period contract and outcomes are defined as per




Region Condition e1 {ed2, e02, e−d2 } Contract Principal’s profits
I h− l < d
φ
< K4 0 (0




< K ′1 1 (1




(1 + p+ h)(h− l)d− (1 + h)(p+ h)φ
h
IV K ′1 <
d
φ
1 (1d, 10, 1−d) S = 0, B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h
, B(d, d) = 2φ
h
2(h− l)d− 2(p+ h)φ
h
Table 4.4: Optimal Two-period Contract with Non-decreasing Constraint



















Figure 4.9: Optimal Two-period Contract with Non-decreasing Constraint
Note: φ = 0.01, d = 1, p = 0.3 in the left figure. φ = 0.2, d = 1, l = 0.02 in the right
figure.
It is also worth mentioning that, with the non-deceasing constraint, the optimal contract
would be a history-independent contract that rewards the agent based on the number of
high demand realizations. The extreme contract II rewards the agent if and only if both
periods have high demand realization, and the gradual contract IV rewards the agent the
























Figure 4.10: Optimal Contract Comparison under Non-decreasing Constraint
Note: φ = 1, d = 50, l = 0.1, p = 0.26.
To summarize, in the presence of limited inventory, I find that when the non-decreasing
constraint is imposed, the period-by-period contract outperforms the two-period contract
when the inventory level becomes a bottleneck. The two-period contract outperforms the
period-by-period contract only when the inventory level is high and the action profile e =
(1, {1H , 0M , 0L}) is induced. When the inventory level becomes a bottleneck, the principal
strictly prefers the period-by-period contract over the two-period contract. Figure 4.10
presents this result. Briefly speaking, with the non-decreasing constraint, the two-period
contract is preferred by the principal in a smaller parameter space.
4.6 Conclusions
It is common for firms to employ salespeople for an extended period of time and com-
pensate salespeople based on their performance during a window extending across multiple
periods. Many sales agents facing a selling task choose between bold actions and safe actions
to generate sales. A bold action has greater potential to lead to extreme sales compared with
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a safe action. An inherent problem with paying salespeople over a long-time horizon is that,
when the agent gets to observe his performance before proceeding to the next period, he
can vary his action in response to past outcomes. Ho¨lmstrom (1979) prescribes an account-
balance plan rewarding agents based on how many times each possible demand is realized
over a period of time, as most efficient for providing incentives. Interestingly, my analysis
suggests a history-dependent plan that rewards the agent for high-demand realization and
also protects the agent against low-demand realization in an earlier period, can be optimal
under certain conditions.
I develop a principal-agent framework in which a risk neutral firm employs a risk neutral
salesperson with limited liability. I focus my analysis on two periods. Both outcome levels
and salespeople’s actions are discrete. The firm can either propose a one-period contract
followed by another one-period contract, or propose a two-period contract that pays only
at the end. Under the period-by-period contract, the two periods are independent, and
following a standard moral hazard problem, the firm would induce a bold action if and only
if the upside potential of the bold action offsets its downside risk.
In the two-period contract, the firm designs an optimal compensation plan taking into
account the salesperson’s gaming behaviors. I find that the principal may find it optimal to
adopt an “extreme” contract concentrating the reward at a hard-to-achieve quota level, a
“polarized” contract that provides makeup opportunities, or an “account-balance” plan that
compensates the agent based on how many times he obtains a high demand outcome. The
extreme plan has inherent pros and cons. On the positive side, it provides larger incentives
to motivate agents with limited liability to take bold actions. The flip side is that the agent
may game his action choice during the later period. I find that the optimal two-period
contracts vary with the upside potential and downside risk brought on by the bold action.
I then proceed to compare the optimal period-by-period contract with the optimal two-
period contract. I find that while it is intuitive that the two-period contract is weakly
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preferred, the firm may strictly prefer the two-period plan, when the upside potential of
the bold action is very small or very large. Under such a scenario, allowing an agent to
adjust his actions dynamically over time may serve the principal, by balancing providing
incentive with generating demand. This result, however, may not hold true when the two
periods become dependent through a limited inventory level across the two periods. Under
the assumption that agents choose their actions under a period-by-period contract based
on the current period’s contract, the principal may benefit from motivating a bold action
in the later period only if demand in the first period is not high. The period-by-period
contract — which suffers less from agents’ dynamic gaming — performs well in inducing such




5.1 Conclusions and Discussions
This dissertation studies multi-period salesforce incentive provisions. I address a fundamental
question that arises in this context: Should salespeople be rewarded using period-by-period
contracts that reward for the outcome of each period, or should they be rewarded using a
multi-period contract that rewards for the outcomes over multiple periods? I consider agents’
dynamic gaming within two different contexts. In Chapter 3, agents are able to vary their
demand-enhancing effort levels dynamically. In Chapter 4, sales agents can dynamically
choose between a bold action with higher sales potential but also higher variance, and a safe
action with limited sales potential but lower variance.
I employ a two-period repeated moral hazard framework with stochastic demand and
unobservable actions, and assume the agent to be risk neutral with limited liability. I find
that with independent two periods, a multi-period contract can perform strictly better than
a repetition of single-period contracts. The intuition is that a multi-period contract rewards
the salesperson only for more extreme outcomes as compared to a period-by-period contract,
which allows it to incentivize the salesperson more strongly to take the desired action (i.e.,
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the action which leads to high expected demand) — I call this the “incentive effect”. The
downside is that the salesperson has the ability to game the contract by adjusting effort levels
strategically across periods — I call this ”the “gaming effect”. The former incentive effect
dominates the latter gaming effect when the effectiveness of the desired action is extreme.
It is noteworthy that the two-period contract that strictly outperforms the period-by-period
contract is not renegotiation-proof. In other words, commitments to a two-period contract
are necessary for it to outperform the period-by-period contract for the principal.
However, with interdependent two periods, the two-period contract may not perfectly
replicate the period-by-period contract, and can even preform worse than the period-by-
period contract, under the assumption that agents choose their actions in response to their
current contracts. I extend to a scenario in which there is a fixed amount of inventory to be
sold across multiple periods — this introduces dependence between periods as the principal’s
preferred action in the later period depends on the outcome of the early period. If the
desired action is induced in the first period, and is induced again in the second period, upon
demand realization in the first period that is less likely to happen under the desired action,
the period-by-period contract performs strictly better than the two-period contract in the
presence of limited inventory.
Another scenario where a two-period contract can be less preferred by the principal
is when firms cannot perfectly observe sales outcomes and agents can choose to destroy
sales. Under the additional constraint that compensation cannot be decreasing in sales, with
independent periods, a two-period contract performs strictly better than a period-by-period
contract in a smaller parameter space. When the two periods become interdependent through
a limited inventory, a two-period contract performs strictly worse then a period-by-period
contract in a larger parameter space.
The insights from Chapter 4 can be built on top of the insights from the effort-exertion
dynamic in Chapter 3. The similarity is that in both cases, the desired action is induced by
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the principal in the first period. This is because under the multi-period contract, motivating
the desired action in earlier periods is weakly less costly than in later periods. Also, an
extreme contract that pays bonuses on the highest possible sales outcomes in all periods can
be most effective in providing incentives in certain parameter space. This is driven by the
agent’s limited liability. If the agent cannot be penalized significantly, aggregating bonus
payment at extreme levels results in less bonus payment for inducing each unit of demand.
However, depending on the contexts of agents’ dynamic gaming, the structure of the
optimal contract can be different. In Chapter 3, an extreme contract that concentrates
rewards at the highest outcome level is the most effective in providing incentive. In Chapter
4, a polarized contract that offers a makeup opportunity can be most effective in providing
incentive in some parameter spaces. This is because taking a bold action increases the
probability of obtaining both high and low demand realizations. Then, compensating the
agent at the end of the second period if the earlier demand realizes at extreme levels can
motivate the agent to choose a bold action in the first period. Another difference of the
two essays are that given agents’ limited liability, with independent periods, the optimal
contract is history-independent in Chapter 3, but it can be history-dependent in Chapter
4. Finally, Chapter 4 enables us to gain a full picture of when the two-period contract can
outperform the period-by-period contract and when it cannot. The assumption that the
bold action not only increases the upside potential but also increases the downside risk is
critical in generating this full picture.
I conclude with a brief discussion of some of my assumptions and limitations. I have
restricted my analysis to the case in which the principal chooses between a two-period con-
tract and a period-by-period contract, but not allowed a mixed contract. I note that the
principal cannot do better by mixing these two types of contracts, as using the better of the
period-by-period and the two-period contracts is a weakly dominant strategy for the princi-
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pal.1 This is because the tradeoff facing the principal remains the same — providing larger
incentives or avoiding gaming losses. The mixed contract cannot provide higher incentives
compared with the two-period extreme contract, and it cannot further avoid gaming losses
compared with the gradual two-period contract (or the period-by-period contract). I have
assumed inventory to be exogenous and have assumed away inventory costs for simplicity.
However, it is straightforward to make the inventory decision endogenous by incorporating
inventory costs such as marginal cost of goods, inventory holding cost for holding leftover
inventory across periods, salvage costs for leftover inventory, etc. These costs will determine
the choice of Ω, and given Ω the results and insights that I have derived will hold.
I have assumed demand outcome and agents’ actions take discrete levels, and in Chapter
4, the outcome distribution is symmetric against the middle level. However, since my main
results are driven by the tradeoff in offering an extreme contract between providing incentive
and inducing gaming losses, I expect them to hold in a general setting as well. By the same
token, if I allow periods to be dependent in other ways (e.g., a high demand outcome in the
early period makes a high demand outcome in the second period more or less likely), my
key insights will hold. Finally I only detail an analysis within two periods, and leave the
optimal scheme with multi-periods for future investigation. I hope my work will cast light
on analytical study in the optimal frequency of dynamic salesforce compensation problems
and encourage further studies.
1A formal proof is available on request.
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A1 Appendix for Chapter 3
A1.1 First-Best Solution
We first list the expected payment to the agent in different regions of the parameter space.
• When U−K ≥ 0, if the principal instructs the agent to exert effort, she pays the agent
a fixed salary of U + φ, and if there is no effort exertion, the principal pays the agent
a fixed salary of U .
• When −φ ≤ U −K < 0, if the principal instructs the agent to exert effort, she pays
the agent a fixed salary of U + φ, and if there is no effort exertion, the principal pays
the agent a fixed salary of K.
• When U − K < −φ, regardless of whether the principal instructs the agent to exert
effort or not, she pays the agent a fixed salary of K.
Now we compare the principal’s profits when instructing the agent to exert effort or not.
The incremental payment to the agent when instructing the agent to exert effort, compared




]− E[st|et = 0] =

φ, if U −K ≥ 0,
φ+ (U −K), if − φ ≤ U −K < 0,
0, if U −K < −φ.
Compared with not instructing the agent to exert effort, instructing him to exert effort can




]− E[Dt|et = 0] = (p− q)(H − L).
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The principal would like to instruct the agent to exert effort if the increase in expected
demand offsets the increase in payment to the agent, i.e., when E
[
Dt|et = 1
] − E[Dt|et =
0
] ≥ E[st|et = 1]− E[st|et = 0]. This is equivalent to the following condition:
H − L ≥

φ




p−q , if − φ ≤ U −K < 0,
0, if U −K < −φ.
A1.2 Period-by-Period Contract
To induce effort e = 1, the expected payment to the agent is max{K,U − q
p−qφ} + pp−qφ =
max{ p
p−qφ + K,φ + U}. To induce effort e = 0, the payment to the agent is max{K,U}.
Comparing the two cases, the increase in expected payment to the agent when inducing
effort (compared with not inducing effort) can be simplified as
E
[
st + bt|et = 1
]− E[st + bt|et = 0] =

φ, if U −K > q
p−qφ,
p
p−qφ− (U −K), if 0 ≤ U −K < qp−qφ,
p
p−qφ, if U −K ≤ 0.
Furthermore, inducing effort from the agent, compared with not inducing effort, increases




]− E[Dt|et = 0] = (p− q)(H − L).
The principal would like to induce effort exertion from the agent if the increase in expected
demand offsets the increase in expected payment, i.e., E
[
Dt|et = 1




st + bt|et = 1
]− E[st + bt|et = 0]. This is equivalent to the following condition:
H − L ≥

1
p−qφ, if U −K ≥ qp−qφ,
p
(p−q)2φ− U−Kp−q , if 0 ≤ U −K < qp−qφ,
p
(p−q)2φ, if U −K < 0.
A1.3 Two-Period Contract
A1.3.1 General Two-Period Contract
By enumerating the optimal contract to incentivize any possible effort profile, we show
that under the weakly-dominant long-term contract, b2(L,H) = b2(H,L). Therefore, it is
sufficient for the principal to focus on the long-term contract that pays at the end according
to cumulative sales.
In the following, we use the labels (ICH2 −ge), (ICH2 −l), (ICL2 −ge), (ICL2 −l), (IC1−ge),
(IC1 − l) and (LL) to denote the following constraints:
(ICH2 -ge) denotes b2(H,H)− b2(H,L) ≥
φ
p− q ;
(ICH2 -l) denotes b2(H,H)− b2(H,L) <
φ
p− q ;
(ICL2 -ge) denotes b2(L,H) ≥
φ
p− q ;
(ICL2 -l) denotes b2(L,H) <
φ
p− q ;
(IC1-ge) denotes UH − UL ≥ φ
p− q ;
(IC1-l) denotes UH − UL < φ
p− q ;
(LL) denotes S + b2(H,H), S + b2(H,L), S + b2(L,H) ≥ 2K.
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• To induce e = (1, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
S,b2(H,H),b2(H,L),b2(L,H)
S + p2b2(H,H) + p(1− p)(b2(H,L) + b2(L,H))
s.t. S + p2b2(H,H) + p(1− p)(b2(H,L) + b2(L,H))− 2φ ≥ 2U (PC)
and (ICH2 -ge), (IC
L
2 -ge), (IC1-ge), (LL)
In (IC1-ge), UH = S+pb2(H,H)+(1−p)b2(H,L)−φ is the agent’s expected utility in
the second period given D1 = H, and UL = S + pb2(L,H)− φ is the agent’s expected
utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: S = 2 max{K,U −
q
p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = φp−q , b2(H,L) ≤ φp−q , pb2(H,H) + (1 − p)b2(H,L) = (1 + p) φp−q .
The following history-independent contract lies within the optimal contract set: S =
2 max{K,U− q
p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = φp−q , b2(H,L) = φp−q , b2(H,H) = 2 φp−q . The expected
payment to the agent is max{2 p
p−qφ+ 2K, 2φ+ 2U}.
• To induce e = (1, p), the principal’s problem is:
min
S,b2(H,H),b2(H,L),b2(L,H)
S + p2b2(H,H) + p(1− p)b2(H,L) + p(1− q)b2(L,H)
s.t. S + p2b2(H,H) + p(1− p)b2(H,L) + p(1− q)b2(L,H)− (1 + p)φ ≥ 2U (PC)
and (ICH2 -ge), (IC
L
2 -l), (IC1-ge), (LL)
In (IC1-ge), UH = pb2(H,H) + (1 − p)b2(H,L) − φ, UL = qb2(L,H). The optimal




0, 0 ≤ b2(H,L) ≤ 1+p−q1−p φp−q , pb2(H,H)+(1−p)b2(H,L) = (1+p−q) φp−q . The following




p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = 0, b2(H,L) = 0, b2(H,H) = (1 + 1−qp ) φp−q .
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• To induce e = (1, 1− p), the principal’s problem is:
min
S,b2(H,H),b2(H,L),b2(L,H)
S + pqb2(H,H) + p(1− q)b2(H,L) + (1− p)pb2(L,H)
s.t. S + pqb2(H,H) + p(1− q)b2(H,L) + (1− p)pb2(L,H)− (2− p)φ ≥ 2U (PC)
and (ICH2 -l), (IC
L
2 -ge), (IC1-ge), (LL)
In (IC1-ge), UH = qb2(H,H) + (1− q)b2(H,L), UL = pb2(L,H)− φ.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: S = 2 max{K,U −
q
p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = φp−q , 0 ≤ b2(H,L) ≤ 1+q1−q φp−q , qb2(H,H) + (1 − q)b2(H,L) = (1 +
q) φ
p−q . The following history-independent contract lies within the optimal contract set:
S = 2 max{K,U − q
p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = φp−q , b2(H,L) = φp−q , b2(H,H) = 2 φp−q .
• To induce e = (0, q), the principal’s problem is:
min
S,b2(H,H),b2(H,L),b2(L,H)
S + qpb2(H,H) + q(1− p)b2(H,L) + (1− q)qb2(L,H)
s.t. S + qpb2(H,H) + q(1− p)b2(H,L) + (1− q)qb2(L,H)− qφ ≥ 2U (PC)
and (ICH2 -ge), (IC
L
2 -l), (IC1-l), (LL)
In (IC1-l), UH = pb2(H,H) + (1− p)b2(H,L)− φ, UL = qb2(L,H).




p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = 0, b2(H,L) = 0, b2(H,H) = φp−q . The above contract is clearly
history-independent.
• To induce e = (0, 1− q), the principal’s problem is:
min
S,b2(H,H),b2(H,L),b2(L,H)
S + q2b2(H,H) + q(1− q)b2(H,L) + (1− q)pb2(L,H)
s.t. S + q2b2(H,H) + q(1− q)b2(H,L) + (1− q)pb2(L,H)− (1− q)φ ≥ 2U (PC)
and (ICH2 -l), (IC
L
2 -ge), (IC1-l), (LL)
In (IC1-l), UH = qb2(H,H) + (1− q)b2(H,L), UL = pb2(L,H)− φ.
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p−qφ}, b2(L,H) = φp−q , b2(H,L) = 0, b2(H,H) = φp−q . Here, the principal offers
b2(H,H) =
φ
p−q due to the non-decreasing constraint. b2(L,H) needs to be at least
φ
p−q to induce e
L
2 = 1. Because b2(H,H) cannot be lower than b2(L,H) according to
the non-decreasing constraint, we will also have b2(H,H) =
φ
p−q . Indeed, the non-
decreasing constraint matters only when inducing e = (0, 1− q). We will reach at the
same contract for inducing any other profile regardless of imposing the non-deceasing
constraint or not.
Note that the optimal contract for inducing e = (0, 1 − q) turns out to be history-
dependent. However, we can prove that inducing e = (0, 1 − q) is suboptimal for the
principal when the two periods are independent (see Appendix A1.3.2 for details), thus
is out of consideration.
• The cases when the principal would like to induce effort e = (1, 0) or e = (1, 0) are
trivially dominated by the case when she would like to induce e = (1, 1) so there is no
need for consideration.
We observe that, although the contract to induce e = (0, 1 − q) is history dependent, it
is suboptimal for the principal; in all other cases, the optimal contract is characterized by
b2(L,H) = b2(H,L). Therefore, when the two periods are independent, it suffices for the
principal to pay the agent the same at the end of the second period based on the cumulative
sales across two periods.
We summarize in Table A1 the expected sales and payments to the agent for different
effort profiles that the principal induces.
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(e1, E[e2]) E[D] S + E[B]
(0, 0) 2qH + (2− 2q)L max{2K, 2U}
(0, 1− q) (p+ q2 + q − pq)H + (1− q)(2− p+ q)L max{2K + p+q2−pq
p−q φ, 2U + (1− q)φ}
(0, q) (pq + 2q − q2)H + (2− pq − 2q + q2)L max{2K + pq
p−qφ, 2U + qφ}
(1, 1− p) (2p− p2 + pq)H + (2− 2p+ p2 − pq)L max{2K + 2p−p2+pq
p−q φ, 2U + (2− p)φ}
(1, p) (p+ p2 + q − pq)H + (2− p− p2 − q + pq)L max{2K + p2+p−pq
p−q φ, 2U + (1 + p)φ}
(1, 1) 2pH + (2− 2p)L max{2K+2p
p−q φ, 2U + 2φ}
Table A1: Two-period Contract
A1.3.2 Optimal Two-Period Contract
We first rule out the optimality of inducing e = (0, 1− q) and e = (1, 1−p) for the principal.
Inducing e = (0, 1 − q) is suboptimal for the principal due to the following reasons. The
saving in expected payment in inducing e = (0, 1− q) compared with inducing e = (1, p) is
given by (p + q)φ, regardless of the value of U −K. (This is because when K < − q
2(p−q)φ,
the expected payment to the agent for inducing e = (0, 1 − q) is (1 − q)φ + 2U , and the
expected payment to the agent for inducing e = (1, p) is (1+p)φ+2U . When K > − q
2(p−q)φ,
the expected payment to the agent for inducing e = (0, 1 − q) is p+q2−pq
p−q φ + 2K, and the
expected payment to the agent for inducing e = (1, p) is p+p
2−pq
p−q φ + 2K.) In addition, the
loss in expected demand in inducing e = (0, 1−q) compared with inducing e = (1, p) is given
by (p2 − q2)(H − L). Therefore, inducing e = (0, 1− q) is dominated by inducing e = (1, p)
if H − L ≥ φ
p−q . This is the parameter space we consider when U −K ≥ 0. For U −K < 0,
inducing e = (0, 1 − q) generates a lower profit for the principal compared with inducing





(1−q)(p−q)2φ, inducing e = (0, 1− q) will
be either dominated by inducing e = (1, p) or inducing e = (0, 0) under the parameter space
we are considering.
We can rule out the optimality of inducing e = (1, 1 − p) using a similar rationale. In
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particular, when U − K ≥ 0, inducing e = (1, 1 − p) is dominated by inducing e = (1, 1)
given H − L ≥ φ
p−q , the parameter space we focus on. When U − K < 0, inducing e =
(1, 1− p) is dominated by inducing either e = (1, 1) or e = (0, 0) for the principal and is also
suboptimal. In particular, when H − L < 2p−p2+pq
(2−p)(p−q)
φ
p−q , we can prove that the incremental
expected demand when inducing e = (1, 1 − p) compared with inducing e = (0, 0), given
by (2 − p)(p − q)(H − L), is no more than the incremental expected payment, given by
2p−p2+pq
p−q φ. Therefore inducing e = (0, 0) dominates inducing e = (1, 1− p) for the principal









p−q , inducing e = (1, 1 − p) will be
dominated either by inducing e = (1, 1) or inducing e = (0, 0) for the principal and thus is
suboptimal.
Next, we compare the principal’s profits for inducing the remaining effort profiles, i.e.,
e = (0, 0), e = (0, q), e = (1, p), and e = (1, 1). We now solve for the optimal two-period
contract.
• Case 1: U −K ≤ 0.
In this case, under the first-best scenario it is in the principal’s interest to induce effort




2K, if e = (0, 0)
2K + pq
p−qφ, if e = (0, q)
2K + p
2+p−pq
p−q φ, if e = (1, p)
2K + 2p
p−qφ, if e = (1, 1)
Under this scenario, we find that inducing e = (0, q) is suboptimal, since the principal
gets a lower profit by inducing e = (0, q) compared with inducing e = (1, p) when
H − L ≥ p(1+p−2q)
(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ, and the principal gets a lower profit inducing e = (0, q)






(p−q)2φ, it is suboptimal for the principal to induce e = (0, q) under this scenario.
Comparing the expected demand and payments for inducing e = (0, 0), e = (1, p) and




(1, 1), if H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)
(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(1, p), if p(1+p−q)
(1+p)(p−q)2φ ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(0, 0), o.w.
• Case 2: 0 < U −K ≤ q2
2(p−q)φ.
Case 2 is the same with Case 1, except that the expected payment to the agent for
inducing e = (0, 0) becomes 2U , rather than 2K. The other payments are the same as
in Case 1. Comparing the principal’s profit for inducing the other effort profiles, we




(1, 1), if H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)
(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(1, p), if 0 ≤ U −K < pq2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ,H − L > p
2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p)(p−q) , or,
if pq
2




(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(0, q), if pq
2




(p−q)2φ− U−Kq(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1+p−2q)(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ,
(0, 0), if 0 ≤ U −K < pq2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ,H − L ≤ p
2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p)(p−q) , or,
if pq
2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q
2
2(p−q)φ,H − L ≤ p(p−q)2φ− U−Kq(p−q) .
• Case 3: q2
2(p−q)φ < U −K ≤ q2(p−q)φ.
The expected payment for inducing e = (0, q) becomes qφ+ 2U in this case. The other




(1, 1), if H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)
(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(1, p), if p+(p−q)
2
(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p−q)(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(0, q), if φ
p−q ≤ H − L < p+(p−q)
2
(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p−q)(p−q)
(0, 0), H − L < φ
p−q .
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• Case 4: q
2(p−q)φ < U −K ≤ qp−qφ.
The expected payment for inducing e = (1, p) becomes (1 + p)φ+ 2U in this case. The




(1, 1), if H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)
(1−p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q) ,
(1, p), if φ
p−q ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q) ,
(0, 0), if H − L ≤ φ
p−q .
• Case 5: U −K > q
p−qφ.
The expected payment for inducing e = (1, 1) becomes 2φ+ 2U in this case. The other
payments are the same as in Case 4. The solution for this case is as follows:
(e1, E[e2])
∗ =
 (1, 1), if H − L ≥
1
p−q ,
(0, 0), H − L < 1
p−q .
Combined together, the optimal two-period contract, represented by their effort pro-




(1, 1), if U −K ≥ q
p−qφ,H − L ≥ φp−q or,
if q
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < qp−qφ,H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q) or,
if U −K < q
2(p−q)φ,H − L ≥ p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(1, p), if q
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < qp−qφ, φp−q ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1−p)(p−q) , or,
if q
2
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q2(p−q)φ, p+(p−q)
2
(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p−q)(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, or,
if pq
2




(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, or,
if 0 ≤ U −K < pq2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ,
p2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p)(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ, or,
if U −K < 0, p(1+p−q)
(1+p)(p−q)2φ ≤ H − L < p(1−p+q)(1−p)(p−q)2φ,
(0, q), if q
2
2(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q2(p−q)φ, φp−q ≤ H − L < p+(p−q)
2
(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p−q)(p−q) , or,
pq2




(p−q)2φ− U−Kq(p−q) ≤ H − L < p(1+p−2q)(1+p−q)(p−q)2φ,
(0, 0), if U −K ≥ q2
2(p−q)φ,H − L < φp−q , or,
if pq
2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ ≤ U −K < q
2
2(p−q)φ,H − L < p(p−q)2φ− U−Kq(p−q) , or,
if 0 ≤ U −K < pq2
2(1+p−q)(p−q)φ,H − L < p
2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ− 2(U−K)(1+p)(p−q) , or,
if U −K < 0, H − L < p2+p−pq
(1+p)(p−q)2φ.
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A1.4 Period-by-Period Contract with Sales Push-out and Pull-in
We derive the optimal period-by-period contract using backward induction. We start from
the principal’s problem of inducing a specified effort profile in the second period.
• Case 1: Consider the case when the principal induces eH2 = 1, i.e., effort is exerted by
the agent when the first period’s sales realization is D1 = H.
Given the reported sales level D′1, even though the principal cannot observe the real
realization of D2 but can only observe the reported sales level D
′
2, she can still infer D2
from D′2 by readjusting the quota level at the second period and setting bonus value
high enough to ensure that if D2 = H the agent will not restrict sales. In particular,
given D1 = H, no matter what sales level the agent reports for the early period D
′
1, if
D2 also realizes as H, the principal expects to observe the second period’s sales level
as D′2 = 2H −D′1 (conditional on the bonus being high enough).
Consequently, to induce eH2 = 1, it suffices to set the quota level χ
H
2 equal to 2H −D′1,
and to provide bonus b2 equal to
φ
p−q . Additionally, since χ2 = 2H−D′1 ≥ H+L−D′1,
in case D1 = L, no matter how much the agent reports, the later quota level will never
be met. This implies that inducing eH2 = 1 will lead to e
L
2 = 0.
Combined together, by setting χ2 = 2H −D′1 ≥ H and b2 = φp−q , the principal induces
(eH2 , e
L
2 ) = (1, 0). We will discuss the level of the fixed salary later, as the agent decides
whether to accept the principal’s contract at the beginning by weighing his utilities
across two periods, anticipating that the principal may readjust quota levels later.
• Case 2: Inducing eL2 = 1, i.e., motivating effort exertion when the first period’s sales
realization is D1 = L.
In a similar way as the case above, we have that the principal needs to set the quota
level at χL2 = H + L − D′1 and the bonus level at b2 = φp−q to induce eL2 = 1. Also,
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since χ2 = H + L − D′1, the quota level in the second period will always be met in
case D1 = H so that there will be no effort exerted. This implies e
L
2 = 1 will lead to
eH2 = 0. Combined together, by setting χ2 = H + L − D′1 ≥ H and b2 = φp−q , the
principal induces (eH2 , e
L
2 ) = (0, 1).
To summarize, to induce a specific effort level, the principal can adjust the quota
level in the second period χ2 based on reported sales D
′
1 in the first period. To induce
(eH2 , e
L
2 ) = (1, 0), the principal sets χ2(D
′
1) = 2H − D′1. To induce (eH2 , eL2 ) = (0, 1), the
principal sets χ2(D
′
1) = H + L−D′1. In both cases, the principal offers a bonus of b2 = φp−q
once the sales meet the quota level. Furthermore, (eH2 , e
L
2 ) = (1, 1) is not incentive compatible
when a salesperson can push out or pull in sales since the range of quota levels required to
motivate eH2 = 1 has no overlap with that to induce e
L
2 = 1.
Now we move to the principal’s problem in the first period. To induce e1 = 1, the
principal needs to set the corresponding quota level χ1 at such a level that, after accounting
for sales push out and pull in, when D1 = L the agent cannot meet the quota, and when
D1 = H he can meet the quota; this is derived as 2L < χ1 ≤ H + L. To see this, given
χ1 > 2L, when D1 = L, the agents cannot make χ1 even by pulling in all available sales L
from the second period. Given χ1 ≤ H +L, when D1 = H, the agent can meet the quota by
pulling in χ−H < L. Without loss of generality, it is enough to consider χ1 = H + L. The
early bonus level b1 as well as the two fixed wage levels s1 and s2 are chosen by accounting
for the second period’s effort profile. Now we discuss all the possible scenarios.
(1) To induce e = (1, p), the principal needs to provide sufficient b1 for agents to exert
effort, which is given by (1 − q) φ
p−q . This is because, if D1 = H, the agent earns s1 + b1 +
s2 + p
φ
p−q − φ; if D1 = L, the agent earns s1 + s2. To induce e1 = 1, the principal needs to
make sure b1 + p
φ
p−q − φ ≥ φp−q , which simplifies into b1 ≥ (1 − q) φp−q . Following this, the
principal pays the agent s1 + s2 + p(b1 + p
φ
p−q ) = s1 + s2 + p(1 + p − q) φp−q in expectation.
Fixed wages are chosen such that the fixed wage in each period is no lower than the limited
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liability, and the two fixed wages combined can ensure the agent’s participation, namely,
s1 ≥ K, s2 ≥ K, s1 + s2 ≥ 2U + p(1 + p− q) φp−q − (1− p)φ = 2U + qp−qφ.
To summarize, to induce e = (1, p), at T = 1, the principal sets χ1 = H + L and
b1 = (1− q) φp−q . Under this contract, the agent exerts effort at T = 1. If D1 = H, the agent
pulls in L from T = 2 to meet the early quota. Then at T = 2, the principal readjusts the
quota level to χ2 = H − L and sets b2 = φp−q to encourage effort exertion. If D1 = L, the
agent reports D1 = L as it is. The principal then readjusts the quota level at the second
period to χ2 = 2H − L which is higher than H so the quota level is not achievable and the
agent gives up.
(2) Similarly, to induce e = (1, 1−p), the principal sets χ1 = H+L and offers b1 = q φp−q .
To see this, if D1 = H, the agent gets paid s1 + b1 + s2 +
φ
p−q ; otherwise, the agent gets
paid s1 + s2 + p
φ
p−q − φ. It requires b1 + φp−q − (p φp−q − φ) ≥ φp−q to motivate e1 = 1, which
is equivalent to b1 ≥ q φp−q . The principal pays the agent s1 + s2 + (2p − p2 + pq) φp−q on
expectation. Finally, the fixed wages are set such that each period’s wage is no lower than
the limited liability and the two wages in combination will ensure the agent’s participation,
i.e., s1 ≥ K, s2 ≥ K, s1 + s2 ≥ 2U + 2qp−qφ.
In this scenario, if D1 = H, agents again pull in L from the second period to earn early
bonuses; the principal later sets χ2 = 0 inducing no effort. If D1 = L instead, agents cannot
make early bonuses and simply report D1 = L; the principal will set χ2 = H to induce effort.
(3) In other circumstances when the principal does not want to induce early effort, the
contract is straightforward to derive and is shown in Table 3.1.
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A2 Appendix for Chapter 4
A2.1 Two-Period Contract
A2.1.1 General Two-Period Contract
In the following, I use the labels (ICd2 − ge), (ICd2 − l), (IC02 − ge), (IC02 − l), (IC−d2 − ge),
(IC−d2 − l), (IC1 − ge), (IC1 − l) and (LL) to denote the following constraints:






















































(LL) denotes B(d, d), B(d, 0), B(d,−d), B(0, d), B(0, 0), B(0,−d), B(−d, d), B(−d, 0) ≥ 0.
• To induce e = (1, 1, 1, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = (p+h)B(d, d)+(1−2p−h−l)B(d, 0)+(p+l)B(d,−d)−φ is
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the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = (p+h)B(0, d)+
(1−2p−h− l)B(0, 0)+(p+ l)B(0,−d)−φ is the agent’s expected utility in the second
period given D1 = M , and v(−d) = (p+ h)B(−d, d) + (1− 2p− h− l)B(−d, 0) + (p+
l)B(−d,−d)− φ is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = φ
h
, B(0, d) =
φ
h
, (p+ h)B(d, d) + (1− 2p− h− l)B(d, 0) + (p+ l)B(d,−d) = (1 + p+ h)φ
h
, B(d, d)−
B(d, 0) ≥ l
h
(
B(d, 0) − B(d,−d)) + φ
h
. The following history-independent contract
lies within the optimal contract set: B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) =
φ
h
, B(d, d) = 2φ
h
. Such a contract is history-independent since the bonus payment only
depends on how many times the demand in each period realizes as H. If both periods’
demand realizes as H, the agent gets a bonus of 2φ
h
; if the demand in only one of
the two periods realizes as H, the agent gets a bonus of φ
h
; if the demand in neither




• To induce e = (0, 1, 1, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 1, 1, 1).
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = B(0, d) =
B(d, d) = φ
h




• To induce e = (1, 1, 1, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = (p+h)B(d, d)+(1−2p−h−l)B(d, 0)+(p+l)B(d,−d)−φ is
the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = (p+h)B(0, d)+
(1−2p−h− l)B(0, 0)+(p+ l)B(0,−d)−φ is the agent’s expected utility in the second
period given D1 = M , and v(−d) = pB(−d, d) + (1− 2p)B(−d, 0) + pB(−d,−d) is the
agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(0, d) = φ
h
, (p +








B(d, 0) − B(d,−d)) + φ
h
.The following history-independent contract lies within the
















• To induce e = (0, 1, 1, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 1, 1, 0).




The expected payment to the agent is (1− p)(p+ h)φ
h
.
• To induce e = (1, 1, 0, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = (p+h)B(d, d)+(1−2p−h− l)B(d, 0)+(p+ l)B(d,−d)−φ
is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = pB(0, d) +
(1 − 2p)B(0, 0) + pB(0,−d) is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given
D1 = M , and v(−d) = (p+h)B(−d, d)+(1−2p−h− l)B(−d, 0)+(p+ l)B(−d,−d)−φ
is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = φ
h
, (p +










. The following contract lies within the optimal contract set:
B(−d, d) = φ
h






. The expected payment to the agent is,
(p+ h)
(






• To induce e = (0, 1, 0, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 1, 0, 1).




The expected payment to the agent is 2p(p+ h)φ
h
.
• To induce e = (1, 1, 0, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-l), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = (p+h)B(d, d)+(1−2p−h− l)B(d, 0)+(p+ l)B(d,−d)−φ
is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = pB(0, d) +
(1 − 2p)B(0, 0) + pB(0,−d) is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given
D1 = M , and v(−d) = pB(−d, d) + (1 − 2p)B(−d, 0) + pB(−d,−d) is the agent’s
expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: (p+h)B(d, d)+(1−2p−h−
l)B(d, 0)+(p+l)B(d,−d) = (1+h)φ
h











. The expected payment to the agent is (1 + h)(p+ h)φ
h
.
• To induce e = (0, 1, 0, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 1, 0, 0).
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(d, d) = φ
h
. The expected




• To induce e = (1, 0, 1, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = pB(d, d)+(1−2p)B(d, 0)+pB(d,−d) is the agent’s expected
utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = (p+h)B(0, d)+(1−2p−h−l)B(0, 0)+
(p+ l)B(0,−d)− φ is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = M ,
and v(−d) = (p+ h)B(−d, d) + (1− 2p− h− l)B(−d, 0) + (p+ l)B(−d,−d)− φ is the
agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = φ
h
, B(0, d) =
φ
h
, (p+h)B(d, d)+(1−2p−h−l)B(d, 0)+(p+l)B(d,−d) = (1+p)φ
h






. The following contract lies within the optimal contract set:
B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
, B(d, d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = (1 + p)φ
h
. The expected
payment to the agent is (2− h)(p+ h)φ
h
.
• To induce e = (0, 0, 1, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 0, 1, 1).
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
.




• To induce e = (1, 0, 1, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = pB(d, d) + (1 − 2p)B(d, 0) + pB(d,−d) − φ is the agent’s
expected utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = (p+ h)B(0, d) + (1− 2p−
h− l)B(0, 0) + (p+ l)B(0,−d)− φ is the agent’s expected utility in the second period
given D1 = M , and v(−d) = pB(−d, d) + (1 − 2p)B(−d, 0) + pB(−d,−d) − φ is the
agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(0, d) = φ
h
, pB(d, d) +










. The following contract lies within the optimal contract set: B(0, d) = φ
h
, B(d,−d) =




. The expected payment to the agent is
(







• To induce e = (0, 0, 1, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 0, 1, 0).
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(0, d) = φ
h
. The expected




• To induce e = (1, 0, 0, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = pB(d, d)+(1−2p)B(d, 0)+pB(d,−d) is the agent’s expected
utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = pB(0, d)+(1−2p)B(0, 0)+pB(0,−d)
is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = M , and v(−d) =
(p + h)B(−d, d) + (1 − 2p − h − l)B(−d, 0) + (p + l)B(−d,−d) − φ is the agent’s
expected utility in the second period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = φ
h
, pB(d, d)+










The following contract lies within the optimal contract set: B(−d, d) = φ
h
, B(d,−d) =










• To induce e = (0, 0, 0, 1), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -ge), (IC1-l), (LL)
and pv(d) + (1− 2p)v(0) + pv(−d) ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d), v(0), and v(−d) is the same as in the above case with
inducing e = (1, 0, 0, 1).
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: B(−d, d) = φ
h
. The




• To induce e = (1, 0, 0, 0), the principal’s problem is:
min
B(D1,D2), D1 and D2∈{d,0,−d}





2 -l), (IC1-ge), (LL)
and (p+ h)v(d) + (1− 2p− h− l)v(0) + (p+ l)v(−d)− φ ≥ 0 (PC)
Under this scenario, v(d) = pB(d, d)+(1−2p)B(d, 0)+pB(d,−d) is the agent’s expected
utility in the second period given D1 = H, v(0) = pB(0, d)+(1−2p)B(0, 0)+pB(0,−d)
is the agent’s expected utility in the second period given D1 = M , and v(−d) =
pB(−d, d)+(1−2p)B(−d, 0)+pB(−d,−d) is the agent’s expected utility in the second
period given D1 = L.
The optimal contract to induce this effort profile is given by: pB(d, d)+(1−2p)B(d, 0)+
pB(d,−d) = φ
h





. The following contract
lies within the optimal contract set: B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = φ
h
. The expected
payment to the agent is (p+ h)φ
h
.
I summarize in Table A1 the expected sales and payments to the agent for different effort








2 ) (e1, E[e2]) Contract E[D] E[B]
(1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h




(1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 1− p− l) B(0, d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h











(1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2p+ h+ l) B(−d, d) = φ
h















(1 + p+ h)(h− l)d (1 + h)(p+ h)φ
h
(1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 1− p− h) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
, B(d, d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = (1 + p)φ
h
(2− p− h)(h− l)d (2− h)(p+ h)φ
h
(1, 0, 1, 0) (1, 1− 2p− h− l) B(0, d) = φ
h




(2− 2p− h− l)(h− l)d
(





(1, 0, 0, 1) (1, p+ l) B(−d, d) = φ
h








(1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0) B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = φ
h
(h− l)d (p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 1, 1) (0, 1) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d, d) = φ
h
(h− l)d (p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 1, 0) (0, 1− p) B(d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
(1− p)(h− l)d (1− p)(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 0, 1) (0, 2p) B(−d, d) = B(d, d) = φ
h
2p(h− l)d 2p(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 0, 0) (0, p) B(d, d) = φ
h
p(h− l)d p(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1− p) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
(1− p)(h− l)d (1− p)(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 0, 1, 0) (0, 1− 2p) B(0, d) = φ
h
(1− 2p)(h− l)d (1− 2p)(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 0, 0, 1) (0, p) B(−d, d) = φ
h
p(h− l)d p(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0) NA 0 0
Table A2: Two-period Contract
A2.1.2 Optimal Two-Period Contract
I first rule out the optimality of inducing (e1, eH2 , e
M
2 , , e
L
2 ) = (1, 1, 1, 0) for the principal. I
can show that the principal gets a lower profit by inducing (1, 1, 1, 0) compared with inducing
(1, 1, 1, 1) when d ≥ p2(h−l)+ph2+lh2
(h−l)(p+l)h2 φ. Moreover, the principal gets a lower profit inducing







(h−l)(−2+p+l)h2 φ, inducing (1, 1, 1, 0) will be dominated either
by inducing (1, 1, 1, 1) or inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) for the principal and thus is suboptimal. Fol-
lowing a similar rationale, I can prove the suboptimality of inducing the following effort
profiles for the principal:
• Inducing (1, 0, 1, 1) is dominated by inducing (1, 1, 1, 1) or inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) for the
principal and thus is suboptimal.
• Inducing (1, 0, 1, 0) is dominated by inducing (1, 1, 1, 1) or inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) for the
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principal and thus is suboptimal.
• Inducing (1, 0, 0, 1) is dominated by inducing (1, 1, 0, 1) or inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) for the
principal and thus is suboptimal.
• Inducing (1, 0, 0, 0) is dominated by inducing (1, 1, 1, 1) or inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) for the
principal and thus is suboptimal.
• Inducing (0, eH2 , eM2 , eL2 ), for any eH2 , eM2 , eL2 ∈ {0, 1} is dominated by inducing (1, 1, 0, 0)
or inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) for the principal and thus is suboptimal.
Combined together, the possible effort profiles to be induced by the principal at equilib-
rium are (1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0). Define
K1 ≡ p2(h−l)+p(2h2−h)+h2(h+l−1)(2p+h+l−1)(h−l)h2 , K2 ≡ p
2(h−l)+ph2+lh2
(h−l)(p+l)h2 ,
K3 ≡ p2(h−l)+p(2h2+h)+h2(h+l+1)(2p+h+l+1)(h−l)h2 , K4 ≡ (1+h)(p+h)(h−l)h(1+p+h) . Comparing the principal’s net profit
under these effort profiles, I get the optimal contract for the principal as below,
• Inducing (1, 1, 1, 1) is optimal when K1 < dφ ;
• Inducing (1, 1, 0, 1) is optimal when h > 1+p
p
l and K2 <
d
φ








• Inducing (1, 1, 0, 0) is optimal when h > 1+p
p




• Inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) is optimal when h > 1+p
p
l and h − l < d
φ




and h− l < d
φ
< K3.
A2.2 Incentive Contract with Limited Inventory
A2.2.1 Optimal Period-by-Period Contract with Limited Inventory
I first solve the subgame at T=2 when Y1 = H. In this case, the remaining inventory is
Ω−H.
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• If Ω− d > d, inventory does not serve as a bottleneck and following the case without
inventory concerns, the principal prefers eH2 = 1 under the condition (h−l)d > (1+ ph)φ
.
• If 0 < Ω− d 6 d, even if D1 = d, the sales cannot exceed Ω− d, thus the principal will
prefer effort Ω > Ω1 ≡ (1 + lh)d+ (1 + ph)φh .
• Following a similar argument, when D1 = 0, the remaining inventory is Ω and if and
only if Ω > Ω2 ≡ lhd+ (1 + ph)φh , will the principal prefer to motivate effort, i.e. e02 = 1.





, the principal prefers to motivate effort, i.e. e−d2 = 1.
Next consider the game at T=1.
• When Ω1 < Ω 6 2d, ed2 = e02 = e−d2 = 1. To have e∗1 = 1, we need
Ω > dh((−1+2p)h+2h2+l)+(p+h) φ
h2(p+h)
. Since the above cutoff value on Ω is smaller than Ω1, we
arrive that when Ω1 < Ω 6 2d, the principal always prefer to induce effort at the first
period.
• When Ω2 < Ω 6 Ω1, e−d2 = e02 = 1 and ed2 = 0. Under this condition,




– If Ω < d, the constraints to make the principal motivate e1 = 1 is Ω > max{Ω2,Ω5 ≡
dh((−1+2h)l+p(h+l))+(−1+ h)(p+h)φ
h(h2+pl+h(−1+2p+l)) }.
• When Ω3 ≡ ( lh − 1)d + (1 + ph)φh < Ω < Ω2, e−d2 = 1 and e02 = ed2 = 0. Under this
condition,




– If Ω < 0, the constraints to make the principal motivate e1 = 1 is Ω > max{Ω3,Ω7 ≡
−dh((−1+h−l) l+p(h+l))+(p+h) (1+l)φ
h((−1+h)l+p(h+2l)) }.
• When −d < Ω 6 Ω3, e−d2 = e02 = ed2 = 0. Conditional on the second period’s outcomes
and to ensure the principal would like to motivate effort at the first period, Ω needs to
satisfy Ω > −dh(−l+p(h+l))+(p+h) φ
h(−l+p(h+2l)) . This, however, contradicts with the assumption that
−d < Ω 6 Ω3. As a result, if the principal has no incentive to induce effort at period
2, she will neither incentivize early effort. This is intuitive since the possible impact of
limited inventory is to push effort towards the later period.
A2.2.2 Optimal Two-Period Contract with Limited Inventory
Compared with the period-by-period contract, the two-period contract pays more bonus
when inducing e = (1, {ed2, 10, e−d2 }) compared with the period-by-period contract. This
includes e = (1, {1d, 10, 0−d}), e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}), and e = (1, {0d, 10, 0−d}). This is
because to induce e02 = 1, under the period-by-period contract, the agent expects a positive
bonus payment in the second period. However, exerting e1 = 1 reduces the probability
of getting D1 = 0. Thus when the principal aggregates bonus payment by the two-period
contract, she needs to offer more bonus to incentivize early effort. In contrast, the two-
period contract pays less bonus when inducing e = (1, {ed2, 00, e−d2 }) compared with the
period-by-period contract, due to the opposite reason. This includes e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}),
e = (1, {1d, 00, 0−d}), and e = (1, {0d, 00, 1−d}).
Therefore, in terms of the optimal effort profiles, besides these induced under the period-
by-period contract in Table *, the principal may also induce e = (1, {1d, 00, 1−d}) and e =
(1, {1d, 00, 0−d}). Furthermore, we need to update the boundary conditions for inducing
e = (1, {0d, 10, 1−d}) and e = (1, {0d, 00, 1−d}). The optimal contract is listed in Table *.
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A2.3 Two-Period Contract with Non-Decreasing Constraint
A2.3.1 General Two-Period Contract with Non-Decreasing Constraint
For the contracts listed in Table A2, the non-decreasing constraint is not met when inducing
e = (1, 1, 0, 1), e = (0, 1, 0, 1), e = (0, 0, 1, 1), e = (0, 0, 1, 0), e = (1, 0, 0, 1), e = (0, 0, 0, 1).
As a result, under the non-decreasing constraint, we need to recalculate the optimal two-
period contract for inducing the above effort profiles, while the optimal two-period contract
for inducing other profiles remain the same. Without specifying the details, I re-summarize
the optimal two-period contract for inducing any given effort profile that meets the non-







2 ) (e1, E[e2]) Contract E[D] E[B]
(1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h




(1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 1− p− l) B(0, d) = B(d, 0) = φ
h











(1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 2p+ h+ l) B(−d, d) = φ
h
, B(0,−d) = B(0, 0) = B(0, d) = pφ
h




(1 + 2p+ h+ l)(h− l)d ((h− l) + (h− l)2 + l + 3(h− l)l + 2l2 + 2p(1 + h))φ
h




(1 + p+ h)(h− l)d (1 + h)(p+ h)φ
h
(1, 0, 1, 1) (1, 1− p− h) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
, B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = (1 + p)φ
h
(2− p− h)(h− l)d (2− h)(p+ h)φ
h
(1, 0, 1, 0) (1, 1− 2p− h− l) B(0, d) = φ
h




(2− 2p− h− l)(h− l)d
(





(1, 0, 0, 1) (1, p+ l) B(−d, d) = φ
h
, B(0,−d) = B(0, 0) = B(0, d) = pφ
h
, B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = (1 + p)φ
h
(1 + p+ l)(h− l)d ((1 + l)h+ p(2 + h))φ
h
(1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0) B(d,−d) = B(d, 0) = B(d, d) = φ
h
(h− l)d (p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 1, 1) (0, 1) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = B(d, d) = φ
h
(h− l)d (p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 1, 0) (0, 1− p) B(d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h
(1− p)(h− l)d (1− p)(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 1, 0, 1) (0, 2p) B(−d, d) = B(d, d) = φ
h








2p(h− l)d p(1 + 2h)φ
h
(0, 1, 0, 0) (0, p) B(d, d) = φ
h
p(h− l)d p(p+ h)φ
h
(0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1− p) B(−d, d) = B(0, d) = φ
h




(1− p)(h− l)d (h+ p(1− h))φ
h
(0, 0, 1, 0) (0, 1− 2p) B(0, d) = φ
h
, b(H,L) = b(H,M) = b(H,H) = pφ
h
(1− 2p)(h− l)d (p2 + (1− 2p)(p+ h))φ
h
(0, 0, 0, 1) (0, p) B(−d, d) = φ
h
, b(M,L) = b(M,M) = b(M,H) = b(H,L) = b(H,M) = b(H,H) = p p
h
p(h− l)d p(1 + h)φ
h
(0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0) 0 0
Table A3: Two-period Contract with Non-decreasing Constraint
A2.3.2 Optimal Two-Period Contract with Non-Decreasing Constraint
Since the optimal contracts for inducing (1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 0) remain the same
as in Section A2.3.1, we only need to prove the suboptimality of (1, 1, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 0, 1).
This is because only these two effort profiles are not dominated by (1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0) or
(0, 0, 0, 0) in Section A2.3.1. Indeed, I can show that under the non-decreasing constraint,




, and is thus suboptimal. Similarly, inducing (1, 0, 0, 1) is always dominated by inducing
(1, 1, 0, 0) for the principal when h− l > φ
d
, and is thus suboptimal.
To summarize, it can be optimal for the principal to induce (1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0),
depending on the parameter space. Define K ′1 ≡ (1−h)(p+h)(h−l)h(1−p−h) . Comparing the principal’s
net profit under these effort profiles, I get the optimal contract for the principal as below,
• Inducing (1, 1, 1, 1) is optimal when K ′1 < dφ ;
• Inducing (1, 1, 0, 0) is optimal when K4 < dφ < K ′1;
• Inducing (0, 0, 0, 0) is optimal when d
φ
< K4.















Figure A1: Optimal Two-period contract with Non-decreasing Constraint
Note: φ = 1, d = 50, l = 0.1, p = 0.26.
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